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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1963
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.O.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in room
2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.
Present: Senators Dodd and Keating.
Also present: Fred Graham, chief counsel; Clyde Flynn, minority
counsel; William H. Barr, research assistant; and Angelina T.
Gomez, clerk.
Senator DODD. We will open the hearings.
Senator Kefauver is not able to be here because he has a sprained
ankle and I am filling in for him. I want to read into the record
the statement prepared by Senator Kefauver as follows:
On several occasions, this country has been reminded that a dangerous
constitutional flaw exists in our presidential system. At least three Presidents
have become so seriously 111 while they were in office that for a considerable
period of time they were incapable of exercising the powers and duties of
the Presidency. However, the Constitution does not clearly authorize the
Vice President, or any other officer, to discharge the presidential powers
and duties while the President is unable to do so himself.
In 1958, this subcommittee conducted an exhaustive series of hearings
into the constitutional problem of presidential inability. The three serious
illnesses of President Elsenhower were then fresh in the public's memory,
and six proposed constitutional amendments concerning presidential inability
had been introduced in the Senate. The hearings proved that there was a
deep concern among governmental leaders and constitutional scholars about
this problem, but that there were equally deep differences of opinion as to
what should be done to remedy the problem.
Since the 1958 hearings, the various interested parties have persisted in
their efforts to work out a satisfactory constitutional solution to this prob-
lem. As a result of these efforts, three proposals have been introduced in
the Senate, and are now pending before this subcommittee. We will order
that these three resolutions be printed at this place in the record: Senate
Joint Resolution 28, Senate Joint Resolution 35, and Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 84.
(The full texts of the resolutions follow, together with the Fed-
eral constitutional and statutory provisions governing presidential
inability:)
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88TrI CONGRESS1 SEIONES. 28
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JAxNUARY 23 (legislative day, .LT\sv.r:v 15), 1963
Mr. KEPAXUVER introduced the following joint Ir.solution ; which was i;l t wi'e
and referred to flie Committee on tlie .Jdiciary
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of tile United
States relating to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office.
1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Repres.entatires
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-
3 thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following
4 article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitntion
5 of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and
6 purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by the
7 legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
8 seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
I
K 4i T ., -
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2
1 "ARTICLE -
2 "SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President
3 from office, or of his death or resignation, the Vice President
4 shall become President for the unexpired portion of the
5 then current term.
6 "hSIc. 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he
7 is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such
8 powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President
9 as Acting President.
10 "S e. 3. If the President does not so declare, the Vice
11 President, if satisfied that such inability exists, shall, upon
12 the written approval of a majority of the leads of the execu-
13 tive departments in office, assume the discharge of the powers
14 and duties of the office as Acting President.
15 "S8Ec. 4. Whenever the President makes public an-
16 nouncement in writing that his inability has terminated, lie
17 shall resume the discharge of the powers and duties of his
18 office on the seventh day after making such announcement,
19 or at such earlier time after such announcement as lie and
20 the Vice President may determine. But if the Vice Presi-
21 dent, with the written approval of a majority of the heads
22 of executive departments in office at the time of such
23 announcement, transmits to the Congress his written declara-
24 tion that in his opinion the President's inability has not
25 terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the
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3
1 issue. If the Congress is not then in session, it shall
2 assemble in special session on the call of the Vice President.
3 If the Congress determines by concurrent resolution, adopted
4 with the approval of two-thirds of the Memnbers present in
5 each House, that the inability of the President has not
6 terminated, thereupon, notwithstanding any further an-
7 nouncement by the President, the Vice President shall dis-
8 charge such powers and duties as Acting President until
9 the occurrence of the earliest of the following events: (1)
10 the Acting President proclaims that the President's in-
11 ability has ended, (2) the Congress determines by concur-
12 rent resolution, adopted with the approval of a majority
13 of the Members present in each House, that the President's
14 inability has ended, or (3) the President's term ends.
15 "SEC. 5. The Congress may by law provide for the case
16 of the removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the
17 President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall
18 then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly
19 until the disability be removed, or a President shall be
20 elected. If at any time there is no Vice President, the
21 powers and duties conferred by this article upon the Vice
22 President shall devolve upon the officer eligible to act as
23 President next in line of succession to the office of President,
24 as provided by law."
~l' ~7 =1'4d~='.~i~:i~'.~w c ".''" ~i~ "?- - .;~ .~ ' i~~
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88Th CONGRESS Jr SE  S RES 35
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEIRUI.\IY 5 (legislative (lay, J.xuAnAR 15), 1963
Mr. KEr.AL 'F.I (for himself n111d Mr. KE.TINO) introduced the following joint
resolution: which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States relating to cases where the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.
1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled
3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the
4 following article is proposed as an amendment to the Con-
53 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all
6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
7 ratified by the legislatures of three-foulths of the several
8 States within seven years from the date of its submission by
9 the Congress:
I
ii. ;- . -~
-" I
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1 "ARTICLE -
2 "In case of the removal of the President from office
3 or of his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve
4 on the Vice President. In case of the inability of the Prcsi-
5 dent to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
6 the said powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice Presi-
7 dent, until the inability be removed. The Congress may by
8 law provide for lie case of removal, death, resignation or
9 inability, both of tlie President and Vice President, declar-
10 ing what officer shall then be President, or in case of in-
11 ability, act as President, and such officer shall be or act
12 as President accordingly, until a President shall be elected
13 or, in case of inability, until the inability shall be earlier
14 removed. The commencement and termination of any in-
15 ability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall
16 by law provide."
I .1 -j - .^ ." - I-. 1 > - ;
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8T SE8SON  S. J. RES. 84
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 28, 196
Mr. HRt'SK.A (for himself tiid 11M . Mlc('l.ur...x) intrt liiwle tile following joilii
resolution: which was ivid twice liid rferimd (o the (oimiiittee on lhe
Judicinry
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the IUnited
States relating to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office.
1 Resolved iby the Sentue and Iouse of Representative
2 of the United Stales of America in C(/igres s a.sefmbled
3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the
4 following article is proposed as an amendment to the Consti-
5 tution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents
6 and purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by
7 the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
8 seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
I
iira.-~ l T T I. r7rW~ I:
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1 "ARTICLE -
2 "SECTION 1. If the President dies, resigns, or is re-
3 moved from office. tile Vice President shall become President
4 for the remainder of the term to which the President was
5 elected.
6 "SEc. 2. [f the President becomes unable for any reason
7 to discharge the powers and duties of his office, they shall
8 devolve upon the Vice President, wllo shall then act as
9 President until the disability of the President be removed,
10 or the term of office of tle President shall expire. Congress
11 shall have tile power to establish a procedure to determine
12 the inability of tile President to discharge the powers and
13 duties of his office; but such procedure must be compatible
14 with the maintenance of the three distinct departments of
15 government, the legislative, tle executive, and the judicial
16 and the preservation of the checks and balances between
17 the coordinate branches. Congress shall provide by law for
8 the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of
9 both the President and Vice President, declaring what
20 officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act
A accordingly, until the inability be removed, or the expiration
.2 of the term for which both officers had been elected.
3 "SEC. 3. Article II, section 1, paragraph 6 is hereby
4 repealed."
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
AaTICLM II, SEOrION 1, CLAUSE 6 or THE CONSTrrTTION
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.
SECrTIN 19 OF TITLE 8 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE ENTITLED "VACANCY IN
OFFICES OF BOTH PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT; OFFICEBs ELIGIBLE TO
(a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representa-
tive in Congress, act as President
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, removal
from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this sub-
section.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section, a Speaker is to
begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is
no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro
tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection
(b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then
current Presidential term, except that-
(1) If his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice
President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice
President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then
he shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such
individuals.
(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under
subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who is
highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Postmaster General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor.
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue so
to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a
qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal
of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph
(1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual
higher on such list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as Presi-
dent.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Sub-
section (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resigna-
tion, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro
tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Repre-
sentatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve
upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this
jr1
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section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case
of the President (June 25, 1948, ch. 644, sec. 1, 62 Stat. 672).
Senator DODD (reading from Senator Kefauver's statement) :
The proposal which is embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 28 was drafted
as a result of the testimony given at the 1058 hearings. This Is essentially
the system that was proposed by Attorneys General Herbert Brownell and
William P. Rogers, as a result of experience with this problem during the three
illnesses of President Eisenhower. It is designed to avoid the pitfalls which
were pointed out by witnesses in the 1958 hearings. It differs from the other
two proposals in that it specifies a method for determining the commence-
ment and termination of a President's inability, and would not require fur-
ther action by Congress.
The Bar Association of the City of New York, the New York State Bar
Association, and the American Bar Association have devoted a tremendous
amount of time and effort to studying this problem since the 1958 hearings.
These three groups have endorsed a proposed constitutional amendment,
which is embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 35. I believe that this proposal
was first drafted by Mr. Martin Taylor, who is here today to appear as a
witness. The junior Senator from New York (Mr. Keating) has joined
with me in introducing this resolution.
Mr. Richard H. Hansen, attorney at law, of Lincoln, Nebr., has studied
this problem for many years. Last year he published a book entitled "The
Year We Had No President," which is certainly one of the outstanding works
on this subject. In his book, Mr. Hansen approved the principle of Senate
Joint Resolution 85, but suggested that such an amendment should clearly
require that the Congress preserve the checks and balances between the three
distinct departments of Government-the legislative, executive and judicial-
when it enacts a presidential inability statute. This principle is embodied
in Senate Joint Resolution 84, which has been Introduced by the senior
Senator from Nebraska (Mr. Hruska).
We are very fortunate that this country now has a young, vigorous and
obviously healthy President. This will allow us to explore these problems
in detail without any Implication that the present holder of that high ofilce
is not in good health.
The essence of statesmanship is to act in advance to eliminate situations of
potential danger, and I am confident that Congress will take advantage of
our present good fortune to prepare now for the possible crises of the future.
Senator Keating, I have just said that Senator Kefauver was
absent due to a bad ankle and I have read into the record a statement
which he had prepared.
Do you have a statement?
Senator KEATING. I have a short statement, Mr. Chairman. I
regret our chairman's incapacity and wish him a speedy recovery.
I regret that he is not here today, because I know of his great
interest in this problem as well as that of the distinguished Senator
who is presiding, whom I am always glad to be associated with.
Senator DODD. Thank you. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH B. KEATING, A U.S. SENATOR
PFOM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator KEATINO. Many citizens would be astonished to discover
that the Constitution does not provide adequate procedures for the
exercise of the President's powers and duties in the event the Presi-
dent becomes temporarily disabled by illness.
No matter what our views may be as to the relative powers of
the three branches of Government, no one doubts that the Office of
President of the United States is the single most important office
in the United States and possibly in the world. It is incredible at
10
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this stage in our history that we have not yet provided clear pro-
cedures for determining in what manner the powers of the President
shall be exercised during a period of incapacitating illness. While
this constitutional defect should be a matter of concern under any
circumstances, in this era of crisis, failure to take corrective action
could have disastrous consequences.
The Constitution provides in article II that in case of the inability
of the President-
to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President.
The most serious defect in this provision is its failure to specify
that a recovered President may regain his Office when his illness
has terminated. If anything, its language implies that the Vice
President does succeed to both the Office and duties of the President
in case of inability, just as has been the case in the seven instances
in our history in which a President has died in office. In view of
this, any President would be reluctant to transfer powers to a Vice
President despite serious illness, and no Vice President to date has
attempted to assume power under such circumstances. Any who
did either with or without the President's sanction would be acting
under a dark cloud as to his status and authority-and the result
could be national paralysis at a time when national leadership is
essential.
Unfortuntely, this is not a matter which can be dealt with by
simple legislation. Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress granted
the express power to provide a method of determining presidential
inability, and we would have to stretch the meaning of the necessary-
and-proper clause beyond reasonable lengths in order to imply such
a power.
There may be some justification for the enactment of a statute
as an interim measure to serve until a constitutional amendment
was ratified. An analogy is suggested by the enactment of a statute
embracing the substance of the 14th amendment before its ratifica-
tion. But the danger in this course is that the people would ques-
tion any assumption of power under the statute, and all the uncer-
tainties inherent in the present situation would persist. The only
appropriate course under these circumstances is adoption of a con-
stitutional amendment.
Even more hazardous than an attempt to deal with this issue by
simple legislation is the attempt to deal with it by agreement be-
tween the President and Vice President. At best, such an agree-
ment provides only a minimum safeguard against utter chaos in
the event of presidential incapacity. In the event a dispute arose
between the President and Vice President as to whether the Presi-
dent's inability had ended, the agreement would not even provide
such a minimum safeguard.
Both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon and Presi-
dent Kennedy and Vice President Johnson have entered into such
agreements. In effect they provide that the Vice President shall
serve as Acting President until the President's disability has ended
and that the President shall determine when his disability has
ended. The President is also to determine when he first becomes
disabled except that the Vice President may make this determina-
.7 1'L- 
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tion "after such consultation as seems to him appropriate," in any
case in which the President is prevented from communicating his
disability to the Vice President.
President Eisenhower recognized the stopgap nature of his ar-
rangement with Vice President Nixon and as the chairman knows,
was a strong advocate of a constitutional amendment. Unfortu-
nately, however, despite the efforts of some of us to deal with this
problem over a period of many years, Congress has been stalemated,
and the necessary amendment has yet to be approved.
This is another case in which action has been stalled by wide-
spread disagreement as to how to deal with a situation with which
there is widespread dissatisfaction. None of the rival proposals for
a congressional, Cabinet or Commission determination of presiden-
tial inability has been able to command sufficient support for ap-
proval, and admittedly, all have their shortcomings. Unless a spirit
of compromise prevails, we must anticipate a further intolerable
delay in closing this constitutional gap.
Both the chairman, Senator Kefauver, and I have in the past
favored different plans for dealing with this problem. Early in this
session, however, we joined in proposing a constitutional amend-
ment (S.J. Res. 35) which we hoped would serve to break the
congressional deadlock. This amendment would make it clear that
the Vice President would not succeed to the Office of President, but
only to the powers and duties of that Office. It would also make
it clear that Congress has the power to provide by law a method
for determining the commencement and termination of any presi-
dential inability. We would both prefer, I am confident, an amend-
ment which would set out in detail exactly what should be done it
a President becomes unable to discharge his duties. But the futility
of holding out for an ideal solution has become evident, and there
is no question in my mind that adoption of our joint resolution
is infinitely more desirable than a further indefinite delay in taking
any action whatsoever. I am hopeful, therefore, that all of those
interested in making progress on this issue will support our proposal
Senator DODD. Thank you, Senator Keating.
Our first witness is Mr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Mr. Powell is presi-
dent-elect nominee of the American Bar Association, and is a
senior member of the firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell &
Gibson of Richmond, Va. Mr. Powell holds bachelor of law and
bachelor of science degrees from Washington and Lee University
and a master of laws degree from Harvard. He holds honorary
doctor of laws degrees from Washington and Lee and Hampden-
Sidney College. He has been active in educational and civil affairs
in Virginia, having served on the Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion and the. State Library Board. He is a trustee and general
counsel of Colonial Williamsburg, Inc. He is also a trustee of
Washington and Lee University and Hollins College. A leader in
the American Bar Association since 1940, he has been instrumental
in the association's program to encourage schools and colleges to
teach objectively and thoroughly the truth about communism and
its contrast with freedom under law.
I could go on for some longer time, but I think that I have pro-
vided sufficient background information. Mr. Powell, we are very
-r' ci-l Pzr~r~ipi~:~iw~ ~jy: LU*~ I_( iiLCrZfll L~_CiCrli-rl ~ Irl- i Ol - 1-*r r- L ~- j
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pleased that you are here, because we consider you a very distin-
guished lawyer and, indeed, one of the foremost authorities on
this subject.
Senator KEATINO. May I join in everything the chairman has
said and to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of
the American Bar Association. It is a great honor.
Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd and Senator
Keating.
Senator KEATINO. You have had a distinguished career in the
law and I want to thank you for the help you have given us today.
Mr. POWELL. Thank you both very much.
Senator DODD. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., PRESIDENT-ELECT NOMI-
NEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF RICHMOND, VA.
Mr. POWELL. My name is Lewis F. Powell, Jr. I am president-
elect nominee of the Amelican Bar Association, and practice law in
Richmond, Va. I appear before this committee today to support
Senate Joint Resolution 35, introduced by Senators Kefauver and
Keating.
The joint resolution proposes an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, specifying that in the case of the President's
death, resignation, or removal, the Vice President shall succeed to
the Office of President, and in the case of the President's inability,
the duties but not the Office, pass to the Vice President. In addition,
Congress would be given the power to prescribe a method for de-
termining the "commencement and termination of any inability."
We in the American Bar Association are especially pleased to
speak for Senate Joint Resolution 35 because this resolution em-
bodies the exact language recommended by the association's house of
delegates in February 1960. I think it is fair to say that this lan-
guage originated with the New York State Bar Association in a
committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Martin Taylor, who is
here to testify today.
The house of delegates is the governing body of the American
Bar Association, composed of some 260 lawyers, representing not
only sections and committees of the association but State and local
bar groups and other legal organizations as well. The resolution,
which became association policy in 1960, and the accompanying
report are attached to this statement as appendix A, and will be
filed.
It is our understanding that the Department of Justice supports
this particular solution to a problem which has been the subject of
concern and study for many years.
The American Bar Association reaffirmed its support of this con-
stitutional amendment at its midyear meeting in 1962. At that time
the house of delegates also approved a proposed congressional statute
on this subject, but was careful to specify that such action should
not be "construed to modify" the previously expressed support for
an appropriate constitutional amendment.
My testimony, therefore, will be confined to the subject of this
hearing; namely, Senate Joint Resolution 35 and the reasons why
it is deemed to be in the public interest.
20-328 0-63---2
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The objective, which we all seek to attain is definitive clarifica-
tion of responsibility and procedures to be followed in the case of
presidential inability. Essentially, the association's position empha-
sizes three main points:
(i) A constitutional amendment is highly desirable, if not
indeed necessary.
(ii) The powers and duties of the President, not the office
itself, should pass to the Vice President.
(iii) Congress should be broadly empowered to prescribe the
proper method of implementation.
The relevant clause of section 1 of article II of the Constitution,
relating to presidential succession reads:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall'act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
As the history of this provision and the divergent views as to
its-meaning have been fully discussed by competent scholars in
previous congressional hearings, I shall make only the briefest refer-
ence to this history.
First, there was the question whether, upon the death of a Presi-
dent, the Vice President succeeded to the "Office" of President or
merely to its "powers and duties." The language of the article II
did not answer this clearly.
However, in 1841, John Tyler established the precedent of succeed-
ing to the office upon the death of William Henry Harrison. This
has since been followed six times without question, so that this par-
ticular ambiguity has been satisfactorily resolved.
But such a precedent is of little value in the event of the tempo-
rary inability of an incumbent President. The two instances of in-
ability, where the Chief Executive continued in office, were in the
cases of Presidents Garfield and Wilson. Garfield was totally dis-
abled for some 80 days preceding his death. Vice President Arthur
did not assume the responsibilities of the Presidency because of the
concern of the Cabinet that Garfield could not then have resumed
the office if he had recovered.
The more serious case of President Wilson's inability, and the
problems resulting from lack of established succession procedures
are well known to this committee.
In more recent years, agreements with respect to presidential dis-
ability have been made between the President and the Vice President
in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Although
these agreements serve to lessen the possibility of confusion, they are
hardly an acceptable permanent solution to this problem.
The questions which must be answered are basically two:
First: Does the Vice President succeed to the Office of President or
does he assume only the powers and duties of that office?
Second: What constitutes "inability" of the President, and how
are the beginning and the end of "inability" to be determined?
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It is the view of the American Bar Association that both of these
questions are satisfactorily answered by Senate Joint Resolution 35.
A constitutional amendment, embodying the language of this resolu-
tion, would make it perfectly clear that the Vice President would
succeed only to the powers and duties of the President in case of
the latter's inability to act.
Such a constitutional amendment would also empower the Con-
gress, by appropriate legislation, to prescribe a method for deter-
mining the "commencement and termination" of presidential in-
ability. It is desirable to leave detailed matters of procedure to
legislation rather than to attempt to embody them into the Constitu-
tion. The important point is that the Congress, if this resolution is
adopted, would have a constitutional mandate to prescribe appro-
priate procedures relating to presidential inability, and this would
resolve doubts which have heretofore existed as to the power of
Congress in this respect.
The American Bar Association believes that a solution of this
unsettled problem is distinctly in the public interest, and urges
prompt adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 35 by this Congress.
The association will work, through State and local bar organiza-
tions to secure the ratification by the State legislatures.
I thank you for the invitation to appear here today.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Powell.
Senator Keating, any questions ?
Senator KEATINO. Would you like to have this resolution by the
American Bar Association, which is attached to your statement, as
well as the report of the standing committee, made a part of the
record
Mr. POWELL. I would, sir.
Senator DODD. It is so ordered.
(App. A follows:)
APPENDIX A
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION
The House .of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1960 adopted
the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the American Bar Association approves the adoption of
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States on the subject of
presidential inability, whereby the sixth clause of section 1 of article II of
the Constitution would be amended to read as follows:
"'In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or his Death or
Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President. In the
Case of the Inability of the President to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the said Powers and Duties shall devolve on the Vice
President, until the Inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President
and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then be President, or in case of
Inability, act as President, and such Officer shall be or act as President ac-
cordingly, until a President shall be elected or, in case of Inability, until the
Inability shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of
any Inability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by law
provide.'
"Further resolved, That the committee on jurisprudence and law reform
be authorized to urge the adoption of such constitutional amendment and to
endeavor to secure the cooperation of State and local bar associations to the
same end."
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The sixth clause of section 1 of article II of the Constitution now reads
as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resig-
nation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be re-
moved, or a President shall be elected."
This clause, as now written, leaves open the question of what constitutes
"Inability" of the President, and fails to provide a method of determining
either the beginning or end of the disability. Similarly, the ambiguity in the
words "the Same" is unresolved, and the question of whether, in the case of
Presidential inability, the Vice President would succeed to the office of Presi-
dent (as in the case of death of the President) or only to the powers and
duties of the office, remains unsettled.
Various suggestions as to the methods of determination of Presidential
inability have been made, including determination by the President, or by
the Vice President or the Cabinet or both, or by an appointed commission,
or by reference to the courts. It would seem (1) that the best constitutional
practice would be to empower Congress to select the method, as is now au-
thorized by the present clause, in the case of inability of both the President
and Vice President, and (2) that the freezing of any one method into the
Constitution would be inadvisable, requiring additional constitutional amend-
ment to correct or change.
Also, It is doubtful whether Congress is empowered to deal with the subject
without a constitutional amendment, and seems clear that ambiguities in the
present clause can only be cured by such amendment and not by act of Con-
gress alone.
Therefore, the committee feels that a constitutional amendment is necessary,
and that such amendment should-
(1) Separate the provisions relating to inability from those relating
ito death, resignation, or removal, thereby removing any ambiguity in
the language of the present provision.
(2) Provide for the determination of the question of commencement
and termination of the inability of the President or Vice President.
If the recommended amendment were adopted, it would mean-
(1) That, in case of the President's inability (as distinguished from
death, resignation, or removal from office), the Vice President will suc-
ceed only to the powers and duties of the President and not to the office
itself, until the inability is removed or a President elected.
(2) That Congress will be called upon to enact 'legislation providing a
method by which the commencement and termination of any inability
shall be determined.
The committee feels that timely consideration of the subject is desirable
and important, even though there be no immediate emergency, and that action
by the American Bar Association will stimulate early consideration in State
and local associations. In making this report and recommendation, the com-
mittee has received, and studied with approval, the report of the Committee
on Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar Association, which com-
mittee has devoted extensive time and study to the subject.
Respectfully submitted.
KARL C. WILLIAMS, Chairman.
RICHARD C. BEROEN.
fIENRY E. FOLEY.
JONATHAN C. GIBSON.
E. HAROLD HALLOWS.
HENRY M. HOOAN.
EDWIN M. RHEA.
Senator KEATINO. I have no further questions. I want to com-
mend you for a fine statement, and to thank you very much.
Mr. POWELL. Thank you, sir.
Senator DODD. Mr. Graham, any questions?
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Mr. GRAIAM. Mr. Powell, I believe that the main difference be-
tween S.J. Res. 35 and the many resolutions which have been intro-
duced in prior Congresses is that it does not attempt to set out the
specific system for determining the termination and commencement
of the President's inability; is that right?
Mr. POWELL. Yes, I think that is right.
Mr. GRAHAM. Why does the American Bar Association feel that
this would be a better solution to the problem than to set out a spe-
cific mechanism in the amendment itself?
Mr. POWELL. We think it is more appropriate to leave the detailed
procedure for action by the Congress. We think a constitutional
amendment along the lines of S.J. Res. 35 would be compatible with the
general framework of the Constitution. The details are more prop-
erly a subject for legislation.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Powell, but what if Congress is unable to agree
on one particular method to solve the problem, and cannot agree
on the statute to be passed pursuant to S.J. Res. 35. You still would
have the problem, would you not, if they cannot agree on a statute?
Mr. POWELL. That is a possibility, of course, but I would assume-
I think we all are entitled to assume-that, if there were a con-
stitutional mandate on the subject, certainly the Congress would
enact appropriate legislation.
Mr. GRAHAMt. You made the statement, Mr. Powell, that the
American Bar Association would make every effort to help in the
ratification of this. Do you think that the State and local bar asso-
ciations would be able to put across to the people the importance
of making this a part of the Constitution, and to explain to them
what is really a very simple amendment to the Constitution?
Mr. POWELL. Mr. Graham, obviously I cannot speak for the State
bars, but we have had a good deal of experience, through the Amer-
ican Bar Association, in working with State and local bar associa-
tions. As I think I said, our house of delegates is a representative
body, with representatives from all of the State bars and from all
of the major city bars. On a matter of this kind, it is the policy
of the American Bar Association to back its action-the action of
the House of Delegates-by enlisting the cooperation of the State
and local bars. All of these, I think, have committees on legislative
or constitutional matters. And so, to answer your question, I would
be very hopeful that, through the American Bar Association, and
its stimulation, we would be able to enlist the active cooperation
and assistance of a large number of State bar associations and the
major local bars.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you.
Mr. POWELL. We certainly will make that effort.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. Those are all of the questions I have.
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Powell. Are there any other
questions?
Senator KEATINO. No.
Senator DODD. We are grateful to you for your fine statement. Un-
fortunately, we have a rollcall on the floor of the Senate which will
require us to leave for a few minutes. We will return directly and
continue with the hearings. We will now recess for a few minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
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Senator DODD. The hearing will come to order. I apologize for
the delay. I thought there was to be another rollcall, hence I
stayed for a while, hoping that it would save us time and myself
some steps. We will resume the hearing. I will ask Mr. Martin
Taylor to come forward. Mr. Taylor is the chairman of the New
York State Bar Association's Committee on Federal Constitution.
We welcome you here, Mr. Taylor, and I am sorry for the delay.
I may add that for many years Mr. Taylor was chairman of
the Subcommittee on Presidential Inability, also of the New York
State Bar and he has led and encouraged the bar associations to
support efforts to resolve the inability problem. Mr. Taylor's sub-
committee was the first to draft a proposed amendment along the
lines of Senate Joint Resolution 35 and the proposal now is sup-
ported by the entire American Bar Association. He is also the
senior member of the law firm of Reed, Hoyt, Taylor & Washburn,
one of the leading law firms in New York City.
Will you proceed, Mr. Taylor?
STATEMENT OF MARTIN TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN, OOMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Mr. TAYLOR. Senator Dodd, when I was here before in 1958, I
learned that the Senators have always said too many polite things
about witnesses and-
Senator DODD. Well, do you want me to strike it, from the record?
[Laughter.] Well, it is the truth.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. I have not a prepared statement,
Senator.
Senator DODD. So we were given to understand beforehand, Mr.
Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. And I felt that instead of using my own words I
would rather read a short paragraph from a book written by Sena-
tor Beveridge on the "Life of Marshall," Chief Justice Marshall,
which dealt with the. precise thing we have before us today:
A constitution to contain an accurate detail of all subdivisions of which
the great powers will admit and of all of the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind * * *. The very nature of a
constitution, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked
and its important objects designated.
The Constitution does not profess to enumerate the means by which the
powers it confers may be executed.
I found that, by chance, after Senate Joint Resolution 35 was
proposed, and it seems to me it expresses exactly what. we have
before us, that is, a joint resolution proposing an amendment which
gives a broad and general power which can be implemented in such
way as may be advisable.
As you know, that general plan has been approved by the Amer-
ican Bar Association. It was originally suggested by the State Bar
Association, and there is an excellent report on it whicl perhaps
is too long to put. into the record, but some of you may care to read
it. It is in the record of the Association of tihe Bar of the City of
New York in volume 17, No. 4, of April 1962, in which they discuss
all the previous things that had been talked about and eventually
approved in principle, what we are talking about today.
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Senator DODD. Mr. Taylor, we will receive that in the appendix, by
reference, in the record.
(The document referred to is exhibit No. 1 in the appendix.)
Mr. TAYLOR. As to the status, now, of Senate Joint Resolution 35,
Senator Dodd, the associations that I enumerated have favored it.
The Deputy Attorney General expected to be here, and I am told
that at a subsequent hearing he will state the position of the At-
torney General, again favoring Senate Joint Resolution 35.
It may be that for the record we should go back a little to see
some of the problems that have been eliminated, so that we can see
the desirability of advocating the present proposal. The character
of inability, I think, now, is generally regarded as being unneces-
sary to a definite theory that whatever tribunal is created by statute
could obviously determine inability, and possibly it would be better
not to handicap it by an attempt at a definition, because I am told
that sometimes lawyers disagree about the text of such things.
The question of whether it is the Office or the duties which devolve
on account of an unfortunate phrase in the original draft, which
said that "the same shall devolve upon the Vice President." The
question arose, what does "the same" mean? The Office or the
duties?
Well, it is implicit in Senate Joint Resolution 35 that it is the
duties. You will have in mind that from the text on determinIng
termination of inability, that otherwise you would have two Presi-
dents, which is obviously not as good as one-and also historically
in various Colonial charters-and some State constitutions there are
provisions covering Governors being out of the State, and so on-
the point is, they all presuppose a return after disability, and I
imagine that was in the mind of the draftsman of the original
sentence.
Oddly enough, in Madison's notes made many years afterward,
the only thing that was quoted was the one phrase--"What is
inability?" Who raises the question-who determines it? And
there is no one else that talked about it until a man named Curtis
in the 1850's wrote a book about the Constitution and- he again re-
peatel that phrase, and that is all there is. In the whole text of dis-
cussions by both Marshall and Storey, who were both very busy on
constitutional questions for 30 years--inability was never mentioned.
So, then, having disposed of those things, which you will recall
from the previous hearings have been very much debated we reach
this point: That it is the duties which devolve. That inability does
not have to be defined. And that it is clear it must be susceptible of
terminating so that the President does not lose the Office. The other
problems that have been raised, I do not think we need to go into,
because I think everyone is agreed on this basic theory of leaving
to Congress the power to create the way of doing it-not doing it.
Possibly a word might be said about this thing, this arrangement
that was prepared by Brownell during President Eisenhower's ad-
ministration. That has been variously defined. Mr. Powell tells
us it was an agreement. I think the Attorney General does not call
it an agreement. ie says it is a statement of an interpretation of
the Constitution.
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It has obvious limitations. First, it is only a statement by the
present President and Vice President. Second, they might dis.
agree. Third, suppose the Vice President is incapacitated. Fourth,
it does not bind any future President. Fifth, somebody might raise
the constitutional question of whether they have the power to make
such a statement. Everyone, that is, is free to furnish his own
interpretation.
However that may be, the Attorney General has stated, I think,
both now and before, that to finally determine the question requires
a constitutional amendment.
Also, there is this other point which has been discussed in the past
and I think now that pretty much the consensus of opinion is the
same-I won't use the word "discarded"-the theory which has been
advocated by very experienced constitutional lawyers to the effect
that it does not require a constitutional amendment, it can be covered
by statute. The suggestion is that possibly the broad language at
the end of the section of the Constitution that enumerates the powers
of the Congress should be broad enough. However that may be,
there is this practical objection to it, giving all due deference to
that view, and certainly there is considerable disagreement with that
view, so that whether a constitutional amendment-or putting it
the other way, whether it could be accomplished by statute-if it
were, it is certainly unthinkable that someone would not raise the
constitutional question, the issue as to whether there was power
under the statute.
I think that practically concludes all the strawmen that have
been struck down during the last 5 years since I have been here
before. I am told that counsel is not going to let me rest on that
statement but wants to ask me some questions; and perhaps Senator
Keating does.
Senator KEATINo. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to express my
gratitude to the help and leadership which Mr. Taylor and others
in the New York State Bar Association have provided in this field.
Mr. TYLon. Thank you.
Senator KEATIo. It is nice to have you here.
Senator DooD. Mr. Taylor, you and the bar have been very helpful
to us, and I join in Senator Keating's expression of appreciation.
Does counsel have any questions?
Mr. GOnRAAMr. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Taylor, I believe that
Senate Joint Resolution 35 was first drafted by a subcommittee of
your State Bar of New York, is that right ?
Mr. TAYLon. It was first drafted in 1958 by the subcommittee of
the State bar association.
Mr. Orn.mA.r. And you were the chairman of that subcommittee?
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I drafted it. That is one reason why I should
he in favor of it. It was subsequently approved by the association,
and I think you have in the record the report of the State bar.
Mr. CRtA,\ M. . r. Taylor, apparently what you have done is
reduced the problem to the barebone constitutional authorization,
and knocked out all of the mechanics; is that right?
Mr. TAyrLOR. Yes.
Mr. GRAHAr.. Now, is it possible that the States may not support
an amendment which gives Congress the power to enact legislation
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when they do not know what legislation is going to be enacted pur-
suant to the amendment?
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, what is in my mind is, I suppose, that it should
be determined as to whether it should be submitted just this way, on
the theory that people would favor giving the power to the Con-
gress without making a specific proposal, when a change might be
controversial; is that what you have in mind, sir? I am not sure
I heard you correctly.
Mr. GRAHAM. Well, it seems to me the question is going to be
raised by any State legislature, that people do not really know what
power they are giving, nor how it is going to be exercised and
implemented.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, is it any different than all of those enumerated
powers in the Constitution where Congress is given the power to
do-let us suppose you were to go back and take whatever-the 18 or
19 specified powers-in order to embody those powers do you think
it would be necessary or even advisable to specify the implemen-
tation?
Mr. GRAHAM. But don't you think this might be a little bare com-
pared to other constitutional provisions which--
Mr. TAYLon. I agree, but the other alternative is to submit a
proposal which quite possibly would be objected to for.some reason
or other, whereas an amendment in broad terms would not be so
likely to be.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Taylor, Senate Joint Resolution 28 would give
the President the power to determine, that is, to declare his own
inability and would empower the Vice President to become Acting
President and discharge his powers and duties. I understand that
if Senate Joint Resolution 35 were adopted in its present form
and until Congress enacted enabling legislation the President would
not have that power, would he?
Mr. TAYLOR. No, but I see no problem about that, because any
tribunal that is created, if the President declared his own inability,
would surely be guided by it, and it does not seem to me necessary
to specify that.
Mr. GRAHr. Now, if Congress---
Mr. TAYLOR. Of course, the difficulty is, he might not be able to.
Mr. GRAHA. Mr. Taylor, if Congress passed a statute which did
not give the President the power to declare his own inability would
he have the power then in case, say, the President knew in his own
mind that he had the inability, to give the Vice President the
power-
Mr. TAYLOR. Doesn't what I said before answer that?-that any
tribunal of necessity would act upon it. Suppose the President said
to this tribunal, "My doctors say I ought to give up." Surely that
would be a factor which would almost compel them to accept that,
wouldn't it?
Mr. GRAHAM. Would you think it would be a good idea to have
a provision similar to the one allowing the President without going
through a tribunal to just announce his own inability?
Mr. TAYLOR. No, I would not.
Mr. GRAHTAM. The resolution in effect states that this would clothe
the Vice President-he would be the Acting President; do you thihk
that it is a good idea to give him the title of Acting President?
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Mr. TAYLOR. Well, you are making it hard to answer. It is hard
enough to get this one amendment through without getting one other
thing accomplished that a great many people have advocated; that
is, that the Vice President be clothed with executive powers. That
is really a separate matter; is it not? It is not primarily concerned
with inability.
Mr. GRAHAM. How would the Vice President sign his name if he
were acting as President pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 35?
Mr. TAYIOR. I beg your pardon? I did not get that.
Mr. GRAHAM. How would the Vice President sign his name?
As "President"? Or as "Vice President"? Or "Acting President"?
How would he sign it?
Mr. TAYLOR. How would he, the Vice President, sign his name?
Well, I thought I had anticipated everything, but I will have to
ask leave to think about that a minute. This did arise, if you
remember, in the case of Tyler, and there was a great debate at the
time, but in that case there was no question of his going back, be-
cause the President had died and that settled it, and-well, he said
he would strike out the word "Acting" and sign it as "President."
And, now, as to inability, I do not want to put words into the
mouth of the legislature, but I think there should be some wording
connected with this thing which would indicate that it was a tem-
porary thing, to phrase the idea that it is temporary.
Mr. GRAHAM. The proposed amendment, Senate Joint Resolution
35, does not create the office of Acting President. Do you think
there need be an office of Acting President?
Mr. TAYLRn. Yes.
Mr. GRAmAM. Acting President?
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, there would have to be a way to do that, I
agree, but I do not think there need be an amendment, it needs to
be covered in the implementing statute.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Taylor, there has been some discussion of the
matter of the President being out of town, or out of the country.
Should that be included ?
Mr. TAYLOR. This was raised at the time President Wilson went
to the Peace Conference, and Mr. Wickersham, the Attorney General,
whose father was my predecessor on this committee, raised the
question as to whether or not that absence was not substantially
the same as inability to perform the duties of his office. I do not
think it got very much support, but it was commented upon. I
would think it unnecessary in modern times. You mean, if the
President went to some kind of a conference abroad, or something
of that kind?
Mr. GRAHAM. Just one final question, Mr. Taylor. I would like
to go back for the moment. Do you think it very necessary that
the President have the right without going to a tribunal, if he knows
he is unable to discharge the duties of his office, to announce that
fact himself, and have it effective immediately? It seems to me that
military emergencies might arise or, certainly, the problem of get-
ting say, NATO moving or getting the Armed Forces to react im-
mediately to a crisis situation. Do you not. think it imperative
that this system allow the President himself as soon as he realizes
he is unable to do this himself, to make it legal in the Constitution
for the Vice President or the Acting President to do so ?
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Mr. TAYLOR. Well, now, I would still think that was not impera-
tive, to use your word. You could conceive of the situation where
the President, let us say, in his second term was not awfully well
and he was overburdened with his tremendous responsibilities-but
it seems to me to be giving him a power which is unnecessary, always
assuming, as I have, that the tribunal was small and that it was
capable of being called and could come very quickly and could act
very quickly.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I have no
further questions.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Richard Hansen,
would you please come forward?
We are pleased to have you here, sir.
Mr. Hansen is an attorney at law in Lincoln, Nebr., and he is a
man who is eminent on this subject a an authority on it, and also
he is the author of numerous articles, I understand, and of a very
fine work on presidential inability, entitled, "The Year We Had No
President."
Under Mr. Hansen's leadership, the Nebraska Law Review has
conducted an extensive study into the problem of presidential in-
ability. Mr. Hansen, we want to thank you for coming before our
committee. Would you proceed as you wish, in your own way?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. HANSEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
LINCOLN, NEBR.
Mr. HANSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure for me to appear before the committee today.
Before I begin discussing the merits and distinguishing features of
Senate Joint Resolution 84, I wish first to direct your attention, even
though only briefly, to the subject discussed by some of the other
witnesses here: the memorandum agreements which Presidents Eisen-
hower and Kennedy have entered into with their respective Vice
Presidents. This was also touched upon by the president-elect of
the American Bar Association, and by Mr. Taylor.
There have been many people inclined to herald these arrange-
ments as the ultimate and final solution to the problems of inability.
1 can heartily endorse the agreements, but only in the spirit in which
both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy offered them-
that is, just as a stopgap until comprehensive legislation is forth-
coming.
Mr. Katzenbach, when he appears here next week, might recall
my endorsement to him of the Eisenhower-Nixon memorandum at
a time when the present administration was deciding whether to
follow that precedent.
What is wrong with this type of agreement? Previous speakers
today referred to the fact that following it is discretionary with a
new President. A brief analysis of the three main sections of the
memo will reveal other serious defects.
The first section of the agreement allows a disabled President to
inform the Vice President of his condition, in which case the Vice
President takes over as Acting President until the inability is
ended.
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The original thought, as conceived by President Eisenhower and
Attorney General Brownell, was that this provision would negate
the Tyler precedent. But this, I think, is a false assumption. Eisen-
hower hoped that, if a President was assured by such an agreement
that he could resume his office upon recovery, he would not hesitate
to temporarily delegate his powers and duties to the Vice President.
But we are confronted with the historical fact that Garfield's,
Cleveland's, and Wilson's refusal to step aside was based every bit
as much on the fact that the Vice President belonged to another
faction of the party or was considered (as in the case of Marshall)
an intellectual nonentity. And Tyler's precedent offered a comfort-
able and plausible excuse for the failure to call in Arthur, Steven-
son, and Marshall-but in none of these cases did it motivate the
refusal.
General Eisenhower is frank about the inadequacy of this section
of the memorandum, which he helped to devise. In discussing this
matter with me at Gettysburg, he repeatedly stressed that its
strength depends entirely upon good will existing between the Presi-
dent and Vice President. There was little good will between Cleve-
land and Stevenson, and between Wilson and Marshall, and none
at all between Garfield and Arthur. Of course, we could also recall
the case of Vice President Calhoun who resigned from office be-
cause of differences of opinion with President Andrew Jackson.
I might add the further thought that there is no precedent in
American history for any President voluntarily relinquishing his
office. The fact that we have a 22d amendment would seem to indi-
cate the American people do not feel that Presidents will leave
office voluntarily. The same principle applies here, but there are
more dramatic examples of disability in American history which
make that application desirable to the inability situation.
The second section of the memorandum provides for the Vice
President to assume the powers and duties of President when the
Chief Executive is unconscious or is unable to communicate with
the Vice President.
The basic problem here is Executive secrecy-the problem of
keeping the Vice President and the public informed. In this con-
nection I must remind you that there is no law in 1963 which even
requires a President to have a physical examination, let alone make
the results public. Some people feel that it is in the public interest
to maintain secrecy about any President's health; they think bad
news would throw the country into a panic and imperil national
security. Let me pose this question to those who favor secrecy about
presidential illnesses.
What would have happened to the stock market if it had been
necessary to announce President Cleveland's death on board the
yacht Oneida at sea following a cancer operation when the country
thought hie was vacationing at home? It is my conviction that a
nation which can stand the news of a Pearl Harbor can adjust to
news bulletins about the President's health. Eisenhower proved
that.
Or consider for a moment the fact that there is not even a pro-
vision for filing the text of these memorandum agreements with-the
Secretary of State, or publishing them in the Federal Register. Ac-
cording to Mrs. Ann Whitman, General Eisenhower's personal sec-
retary, it was necessary for the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement to be
"very tightly held and to my certain knowledge less than a handful
of people in Washington have ever seen the documents." (Letter
from Mrs. Whitman to Richard H. Hansen, dated Sept. 6, 1961.)
The same situation prevails with regard to the Kennedy-Johnson
memo. Both are evidenced in the public record by news releases.
Now, certainly, no person would accuse either General Eisenhower
or President Kennedy of attempting deception, for these private
agreements are the only way they can reach the problem.
But, gentlemen of the committee, does it not strike you as a little
bit strange that we have a law requiring publication of presidential
proclamations on matters involving the administration of Palmyra
Island and National Forest Products Week-but that an agreement
determining temporary succession to the presidency is "tightly
held"?
The last section of the memorandum allows the President to de-
termine his own recovery. Many Senators and Representatives
have raised the question of what would happen if a mentally ill
President announced his recovery prematurely. And the stock
answer always is: impeachment. Is mental illness a "high crime
and misdemeanor"? The memo agreement is silent on this point.
How many men of good will in the Congress would vote for im-
peachment under such conditions?
My remaining remarks will be directed primarily to Senate Joint
Resolution 84, introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan.
These two Senators, in common with many of us, have been con-
cerned for several years with the alarming problems of presidential
inability. In speaking about Senate Joint Resolution 84, some of
the objections I have to the other two proposals under consideration
will become apparent. Nevertheless, I shall also be glad to answer
any specific questions regarding Senate Joint Resolution 35 and
Senate Joint Resolution 28.
By this time,. the reasons for using the means of a constitutional
amendment as a first step to a solution should be clear. A majority
of scholars favor this route, among them being three Attorneys
General-Brownell, Rogers, and Kennedy.
While I subscribe to this school of legal thought, I readily admit
that there are also some profound legal intellects-Edward S. Corwin,
for instance--who favor a direct approach by a simple congres-
sional act. But, gentlemen, the mere fact that there is a dispute
among men who have thoroughly studied the question means to a
pragmatist that if we settle for anything less than an amendment,
we will be asking for litigation at a time when delays are least de-
sirable-when a President is ill.
What should the amendment include?
Cornelius Wickersham, one of the finest lawyers in the United
States and a serious student of this problem, has ably stated the case
for simplicity and flexibility in his article in 7 Villanova Law Re-
view 262. That excellent presentation stresses the need for main-
taining the traditional flexibility of the Constitution and confining
the amendment to a statement of general principle, rather than
trying to spell out in detail the method for determining presidential
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disability. In that respect I endorse his conclusions wholeheart-
edly-and the similar remarks made along that line by Mr. Taylor
and Mr. Powell.
The greatest area of disagreement among students of this subject
revolves around the precise method for the determination of in-
ability. I am sure you will recall that President Eisenhower's pro-
posals ran into needless opposition because they tried to incorporate
the method into the Constitution. And, being realistic about this
problem, we must realize that it is so complex that the more sound
and simple the initial approach, the more likelihood there is of re-
ceiving favorable attention from busy Senators and Representatives.
If we can clarify for all time the powers of the Congress to legis-
late on the topic, in working toward that end we will create a
better atmosphere, I think, of cooperation in devising a specific
method for determining presidential inability.
There is another very practical reason for keeping the method
itself in a form susceptible to easy amendment. Should Congress
see fit to stress the medical aspects in the mechanics of the determi-
nation process, they could adapt it from time to time to keep pace
with developments in medicine. This is a medico-legal problem,
noi merely a legal problem. I will not dwell on the amendment ap-
proach, for it has been discussed thoroughly by the other witnesses
today.
The conclusions just referred to comprise the backbone of Senate
Joint Resolution 35, which was the creation of the American, New
York, and New York City Bar Associations, and the brain child of
my good friend, the eminent lawyer, Mr. Martin Taylor. Congress
should give careful attention to the proposals offered on behalf of
these distinguished gentlemen and organizations, representing as
they do, the thinking of some of the Nation's most astute legal
scholars.
Why, then, you might ask, gentlemen, has Senate Joint Resolution
84 been introduced and how does it differ from the bar association
proposal ?
Senator Kefauver has stated:
We wrestle with delicate problems touching upon the fundamental prin-
ciples of separation of powers and the coordinate independence of the separate
branches of Government.
It is necessary, in granting and in clarifying the powers of Con-
gress to include a safeguard of some type for the separation of
powers doctrine. This, in my opinion, is not done by the bar
association proposal.
I would invite to your attentipn the fact that our ex-Presidents,
* in their writings on this subject, have shown a preoccupation and
concern with the maintenance of a separation of powers. For in-
stance, Attorney General William P. Rogers offered a resolution
before the Congress which, if you will remember, kept the determi-
nation of disability within the executive branch. This was no acci-
dent. It was based on solid ground-the separation of powers.
Brownell was concerned over a shift in checks and balances.
What are former President Herbert Hoover's conclusions? He
has stated that "the method of determining 'inability' or 'recovery'
requires consideration of the spirit of the separation of powers in
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the Government." And he then proposed a method which would
keep the determination in the executive branch, specifically, the
Cabinet.
Now, I am not trying to suggest to you that the three ex-Presi-
dents are all in accord on a method for determining disability. I
have visited with two of them about it, and they are not. But we
are not concerned in Senate Joint Resolution 84 with the method;
we are not trying to duplicate past mistakes and get the cart before
the horse.
What I am seriously stressing to you is that the ex-Presidents are
concerned with avoiding any shift in the checks and balances which
keep the gigantic organization of Government on an even keel.
The writings of the ex-Presidents are there for all to see, and
this aspect is one worthy of the deepest and most serious considera-
tion.
The judicial branch shares the concern over separation of powers.
This is illustrated by thJ-leffter 'whi T l hieL Justice Warren wrote
to Senator Keatingaat a time when the distinbgished Senator was
investigating tha possibility of having the Supreme Court make the
determination,6f presidential inability. The Chitef Justice said:
It has beenqhe belief of all pftus [the Supreme Court] that' ecause of the
separation Qf powers in our Government the nature of the Judicial process,
the possibility of a controversy 'of this character coming to. the Court,
and the danger of disqualiflcation which night result in the lack of a quorum,
It would 'be inadvisable for any member "of-the Court to serve on such a
commission * * * I do believe 'tat - the seasons above mentioned for non-
participation of the Court are in ftiplu4table.
Twenty years-of criticsrn and bitterness toward the members
of the Court who served on the electoral Commission of 1876 offer
sufficient proof of the wisdot:o.- itef Justice Warren's statement.
SOne of our leading objectives, I hih)k should be to eliminate, so
far as humanly possible, politics /from the method for deterining
presidential inability. The, majbrity/of the. present Members of
the Congress would subscribe with.eeliig to this.principle for they
are no less interested, I am sure, than the Supreme Court in main-
taining the coequal nature of the three branches of Government.
But it hiks not always been so, ahd may notralways be so. Let us
recall the shameful period following the Civil War when a group
of willful, scheming men cast a lasting shadow on the impartiality
of the legislati branchh by their sadistic attempt to impeach Presi-
dent Andrew Johnso_.
When I mentioned thisppint to former.President Harry Truman,
he brushed it aside by statiig that if Abraham Lv~'oln had lived
that same Congress would have impeached the 16tf President. Of
course, I am aware that many historians agree with the man from
Independence, but the point hardly proves that we are insured of
impartial determination of such questions by Congress. "Profiles in
Courage" has a chapter about the man who cast the deciding vote
against the impeachment. (Kennedy, John F., "Profiles in Cour-
age," New York: Harpers, 1955; ch. VI, p. 126, concerns Edmund
G. Ross.) This ugly episode cannot be dismissed from our con-
sideration by oversimplifications.
These are several of the most serious reasons why I believe that
while we should give Congress the power to legislate in this area, we
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must act wisely in giving this body a guideline which will require an
examination of such vital points in adopting a method for determin-
ing the disability of the President.
Let us realize, also, in deciding on an appropriate amendment,
that the final solution will not be the work of any one man, any
one organization any one mind, but of a concert of thinking by
men of good will. There can be no pride of authorship by any
of us in regard to the amendment, for this will be the reaction of
small minds to a large problem. And in our quest for an answer
to this 180-year-old dilemma, it might be well for us to remember
as Benjamin Franklin said, that "God governs in the affairs of
man." It is true of amendments as it was of the original Constitu-
tion.
In that spirit we can proceed with confidence though the problem
is complex. In that spirit we will work together to see that an
amendment is adopted and the constitutional void closed. For it
would be a sad commentary on us all if we spent millions for
defense and lost a war because we failed to amend a vital section
of the Constitution and provide continuity in the Executive.
Senator DODD. Mr. Hansen, that is a very fine statement, and a
very interesting one, and I am sure that every member of the com-
mittee will be interested in reading it-some of us could not be here-
but I am sure they will read it carefully and agree with me it is an
excellent presentation on this very important matter.
Are there any questions
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hansen, can you make
available for us copies of the memorandum agreements of Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy? Do you have them? You used the
term that they were "tightly held."
Mr. HANSEN. I can get a copy of the press release issued by the
Kennedy administration and make it available, Mr. Graham; but the
originals, as I said and you just noted, are tightly held and no one
has access to them.
Mr. GRAHAM. The press releases would not actually cover the
wording; is that right?
Mr. HANSEN. I don't know. They say it covers the main points,
and I am sure President Kennedy and General Eisenhower would
not try to deceive the public. But the point is that we need a law
requiring publication of these matters, because we may not always
have men who are so forthright as our last two Presidents.
Mr. GRAHAM. Could you get the press release, and make it an
exhibit to your statement?
Mr. HANSEN. Yes; I would he glad to provide copies of the
press release from President Kennedy's office.
(The press release is printed in the appendix to the record as
exhibit No. 2.)
Mr. GRAHAM. I wish we had time, so we could go into these
matters in detail. But, there are two other things I do want to ask.
Firstiof all, the essence of your version, as you state it, is preserving
the separation of the three branches of the Government-the execu-
tive, the legislative, and the judiciary, and the preservation of the
system of checks and balances between the branches of Government.
Now, Mr. Hansen, if Senate Joint Resolution 84 were made an
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amendment to the Constitution and, if pursuant to it'the Congress
passed a statute, would not that statute be subject to challenge and
litigation on the ground it does not comply with this provision in the
amendment?
Mr. HANSEN. Well, I think a great deal would depend on how
we go about devising the machinery for determining the disability
of the President. I would hope, if this amendment should pass the
Congress and be approved by the States, that President Kennedy, or
the incumbent President, would appoint a commission of great na-
tional prestige-perhaps two Justices of the Supreme Court, the
Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate--
in order to avoid embarrassing the Vice President-and two members
of the executive branch, with the three ex-Presidents as ex officio
members, so their ideas could be considered and we could have the
benefit of their experience and their advice, but not be bound by it.
Now, I think we ar going'-to"liefrto''rtproach this thing with
seriousness, and with pcosiousness of the facNkhat this cannot be
simply something devised by one or two people. 4t is going to
have to have a at deal of prestige and a lot of thought behind
it. Does that answer your question?
Mr. GRAHAM. I understand many heads are needed. my ques-
tion now is if such a bill were in fact adopted, and if it* did not
preserve the system of checks and balances, it would be unconstitu-
tional, would it not? Would it n9trbeubject to challenge?
Mr. HANSEN. Perhaps, but tere s always a chance of litigation
when you'pass any law. I thik. this is a superficial objection and the
clause would obviate more litigationthan it would create.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very mubh...
Senator DODD. Ahy furthi quiesti s 1? i(No response.) '- /
Senator DODD. I might addn cloin tfissession that there is a
possibility that somb questions -a in our minds after this
hearing is lover and'also, Mr. a n, yo might think of ome-
thing additional which would be of benefit o the committee. I be-
lieve, therefore, that it would be best to keen the record of the com-
mittee open i~ith a view to that possibilty, , and also, in view
of the fact that the chairman was temporarily unable-to attend.
We shall leave the'cord open. .
Mr. HANSE . I wund, Senator, be very happy to answer any ques-
tions the committee mighthave; and I am also-glad to see no im-
pairment of succession he'Min-. -behalf..of *the contiity of the
executive-
Senator DODD. Well, I hope we get along all right. Thank you
very much, Mr. Hansen.
Mr. HANSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
(Supplemental statement received from Mr. Hansen follows:)
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. HANSEN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CON-
STITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, HEARINGS ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Since the separation-of-powers doctrine Is implied, Its practical application
has necessarily been by the courts. The doctrine has been held pertinent
to some sections of the Constitution and not to others, and the Interpretations
have often been questioned. Tf the basic reason for a constitutional amend-
ment is to avoid litigation when the President Is iii, the same reason logically
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compels us to make the separation of powers clearly applicable to the disability
clause.
There is no certainty that the doctrine will be applied to the wording of the
8.J. Res. 85. Furthermore, court decisions regarding other sections of the
Constitution, where the doctrine has been applied, would not be negated by its
inclusion here. Its recognition in the disability clause is essential when we
consider that the doctrine has been made almost disreputable by riddles of
administrative law.
During the 19 months' study by the staff of the Nebraska Law Review, care-
ful attention was given the multitude of bills introduced following President
Eisenhower's illness. Many would have disrupted the balance of power.
Others indicated little concern with this aspect of the problem. Can we be
insured of such attention a scant 5 years later?
The concern of the ex-Presidents with keeping the determination of dis-
ability within the executive branch clearly explains what the phrase means.
These men have given the matter deep thought We ought not ignore their
message, and leave the door open to certain confusion and possible vetoes which
could prove disastrous.
President Madison objected when the Constitutional Convention wished to
give Congress power to remove a President pending impeachment trial. The
Convention followed his advice and did not disrupt the tripower concept. The
inability amendment should thereby embody this clause. The subcommittee
should heed a wise principle recognized by the Father of the Constitution.
(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to
call of the Chair.)
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TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 1968
U. S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.O.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a.m., in room
2228, New Senate Office Building, Hon. Estes Kefauver (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kefauver, Dirksen, Fong, and Keating.
Also present: Fred Graham,'chief counsel, Clyde Flynn, minority
counsel, William H. Barr, research assistant, and Angelina T.
Gomez, clerk.
Senator KEFAUVER. The committee will come to order. We are
happy to say the ranking minority member and minority leader,
Senator Dirksen, is present; and other Senators will be here shortly.
This is the second hearing we have had on resolutions dealing with
the problem of presidential inability.
My opening statement was made and placed in the record at the
previous meeting, as were other statements by other Senators.
It has been recognized by Members of the Conress, by members
of the bar, the Executive, and by citizens generally for some time
that this is a problem that should be dealt with. And, as I pointed
out in my opening statement, it should be dealt with in a time when
there is no immediate necessity for the legislation, but in preparation
for the future. By that I mean we have a very healthy President
and it is not anticipated that the resolution or any laws passed in
the event the amendment is adopted, will be used any time in the
near future. However there have been previous times when we
have had Presidents who have been disabled, and of course there
may be in the future.
Our looking into this matter at this time and acting on it, I hope,
at a time when there is no expected necessity of having to use the
resolution and laws passed pursuant to it, is similar to the states-
manlike and thoughtful resolution that was passed out of the Judi-
ciary Committee 2 weeks ago. The resolution was sponsored by
Senator Dirksen and others, and it provided that in the future the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. It was not
passed in anticipation of any present situation, but only in looking
toward the future.
Before we have our first witness, Senator Dirksen, do you wish
to make any comment?
Senator DIRKSEN. Not at this time, thank you.
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Senator KEFAUVER. We are delighted to have as our first witness
Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, a very able and hard working lawyer who is doing a
fine job in his position. Mr. Katzenbach began his Government serv-
ice in 1961 as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, Department of Justice, and assumed his present duties in April
1962. Previously he was professor of the University of Chicago Law
School and also had been a member of the Law Faculty of Yale, and
has had wide legal experience.
Mr. Katzenbach, we are glad to have you here. If you will,
proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; ACCOMPANIED BY NATHAN
SIEGEL, ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
Mr. KATZENBACH. I am delighted to be here, Senator. I have a
prepared statement. Would you like for me to read that ?
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, if you will, sir.
Mr. KATZENBACHI. Once again this subcommittee is confronted with
the very difficult and all-important task of attempting to clarify the
law relating to succession of the Presidency in the event that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his Office.
There are three proposals before you designed to have this effect
by amending the Constitution as it relates to the contingency of presi-
dential inability. One, a relatively clear and uncomplicated proposal,
is Senate Joint Resolution 35, introduced by Senator Kefauver and
Senator Keating, which seems to us the best of the three. Another,
Senate Joint Resolution 84, introduced on May 28, 1963, by Senator
Hruska and Senator McClellan, is similar to Senate Joint Resolution
35, except for one provision which I shall discuss hereafter. The
other, more elaborate and detailed, is Senate Joint Resolution 28.
Each of these proposals would replace and repeal by implication the
sixth clause of section 1, article II of the Constitution, which provides
as follows:
In Ccse of the removal of the President from Office, or his Death, Resig-
nation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law pro-
vide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.
The subcommitte may recall that in 1961 the Attorney General ren-
dered an opinion to the President dealing with the question of presi-
dential inability. With your permission I should like to make this
opinion a part of the record in these hearings.
SenatorKEFAUVER. Without objection, it will be made a part of the
record in the appropriate place.
(The document referred to is printed in the appendix to the record
as exhibit No. 3.)
Mr. KATZENBACH. Since it comprehensively discusses the problem
and its history, and inasmuch as the subcommittee is already fully
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aware of this background, I see no point in reviewing the matter
again except as it may be necessary to an understanding of what is
contemplated by the proposed amendments.
It is generally agreed that the sixth clause of article II, section 1
no longer provides any problem in the event of the death of a
President. In such a contingency as a matter of historical practice,
established by John Tyler, and followed by six other Vice Presidents,
the Vice President becomes President. The first sentence of Senate
Joint Resolution 35 reflects this tradition in the case of death, but
extends the same principle to a case of removal of, or resignation
by, the President. In these three contingencies-removal, death,
or resignation of the President-the Vice President would become
President and be sworn in as President.
Senator KEFAUVER. Just a minute, Mr. Katzenbach. We are
glad to have Senator Fong, a member of the subcommittee, with us.
Senator, our witness is Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach.
Senator FONo. Thank you.
Mr. KATZENBACH. When we turn to the problem of presidential
inability, however, a similar settled practice on which to rely does
not exist although the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement and the identical
Kennedy-Johnson agreement represent a basis upon which such a
practice may be established. It is with respect to inability that article
I, section 1, clause 6 is unclear on two important points. The first
is whether it is the office of the President or the powers and duties
of the said office, which devolve upon the Vice President, in the
event of Presidential inability. The second is who shall rise the
question of "inability", and who shall make the determination as
to when it commences and when it terminates.
S.J. Res. 35 is designed to clarify both of these points. Its second
sentence makes it clear that it is not the "office" but merely the
"powers and duties" of the office which devolve on the Vice President
until the inability has been removed. While the language used may
be adequate, in order to make it clear beyond dispute in what capacity
the Vice President would be serving, signing proclamations, orders
and other documents in this situation, I would suggest that the words
"as Acting President" should be included after the words "Vice Pres-
ident" in lines 6-7, page 2 of the proposal, as was done, for example, in
sections 2 and 3 of S.J. Res. 28. It seems to me that if a Vice President
undertook to exercise presidential power under the second sentence of
S.J. Res. 35 he would feel assured that no one would look upon him
as a usurper. It was precisely this fear which deterred Vice Presi-
dent Arthur from acting after President James Garfield was shot
in 1881 and lay in a coma for 80 days completely unable to perform
any of the duties of the presidency. So, too, when Woodrow Wilson
suffered a stroke in 1919, Vice President Marshall refused to assume
any of the powers of the presidency because of the constitutional
uncertainty of some as to whether Wilson could resume his office
upon his recovery. The second sentence of S.J. Res. 35 is intended
to provide a disabled President with a clear constitutional guarantee
that he can return to his office as soon as he determines that his in-
ability has ended.
The third sentence of S.J. Res. 35 relates to cases of removal, death,
resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice President
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is involved, the proposal makes it plain that the officer who shall act
as President (presently under and pursuant to the Succession Act of
1948) shall do so on a temporary basis until a President is elected
or the inability is removed.
The flst sentence of S.J. Res. 35 leaves it to Congress to decide what
the procedures shall be for determining "the commencement and
termination of any inability." This is, of course, bound to be the
most controversial feature of S.J. Res. 35.
One objection may be that this provision is a blank check which, if
abused, could upset the balance of power between the legislative and
executive branches, and place the President at the mercy of a hostile
Congress. I think this danger is quite remote, and at all events not
great enough to outweigh the advantages of conferring this authority
upon the Congress which represents the national electorate over more
complex constitutional provisions. If the methods adopted by Con-
gress for dealing with the problem do not meet the standards of the
separation of powers or otherwise satisfy the President, he may veto
the bill, and his veto could be overridden only by two-thirds of each
House. Moreover, if Congress enacts a measure which is approved by
the President, and thereafter attempts to amend or repeal it, its action
will also be subject to approval or veto by the President. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that any bill would ever be enacted into law which
was not acceptable to the President, and which did not afford
adequate protection to the people and to the office of the President.
It may be noted that a proposal such as Senate Joint Resolution 35
has the support of the American Bar Association, the New York State
Bar Association and the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. It is hardly likely that there would be such unanimous
support for this proposal among these eminent lawyers if they
believed the risk of impairing the balance of power under the Con-
stitution was substantial or real. Congress, it will be recalled,
presently has the authority under the Constitution to enact laws
of succession when both the President and Vice President have
suffered inability. Vesting similar authority in the Congress to
determine procedures on the inability of the President alone would
not therefore be a drastic departure from the authority it has always
had under the Constitution i rather it would be consistent with it.
Indeed, there are many eminent scholars-among them Everett S.
Brown, Edward S. Corwin Charles Fairman, Davis Fellman,
James Hart, Arthur N. Holecombe, and Mark DeW. Howe, to
name only a few-who are of the opinion that Congress may deal
with the problem merely by statute, and that it requires no amend-
ment to the Constitution. Without regard to whether these scholars
are right there are persuasive arguments against freezing any
specific plan in the Constitution by which a Presidents inability
may be determined in the event of an impasse between the Presi-
dent and Vice President.
I think Senator O'Mahoney summed up very well the reasons why
the approach to the problem taken by a proposal such as Senate Joint
Resolution 35 should be preferred over others. Testifying before this
committee in 1958, he said:
The President is the only Federal officer elected by all the people of all
the States. The Members of Congress are elected by the people of several States
and congressional districts.
34
t& '- 0 %P -- V _ ,tl -It - -- - - I I - .- -r .-- -. I - -, I. ir , . . , - 1
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
We are, of course, dealing with the highest elective office which is in the
power of the people of the United States to bestow on any man. * * * The
determination of the inability, of the President of the United States must be
publicly accepted and the vehicle calculated to gain public acceptance most
readily, it seems to me, is the vehicle to be adopted. There is no group, nor
could there be any individual, who represents a better cross-section of public
opinion than the Congress of the United States. Their decision would be less
apt to be motivated by temporary gain than any other agency for any such
temptation would be tempered by the knowledge that they would soon have
to stand accountable before the people of the United States in free and open
elections.
While the Department in general favors the procedures provided
for in the fourth sentence of Senate Joint Resolution 35, it is of the
opinion that it should be clarified. Presumably it is not intended by
this sentence that after ratification of the amendment but pending
enactment of implementing legislation by Congress, a President and
Vice President shall be precluded from entering into an understand-
ing such as was approved by the past two administrations. For,
after ratification but prior to enactment of implementing legisla-
tion, such an understanding would still continue to serve the useful
purpose of encouraging a Vice President to discharge the powers and
duties of the Office of President, until the latter's disability was
ended, and make possible the uninterrupted operation of the affairs
of the Government. Indeed, such an agreement helps to solve most
of the problem, although admittedly it does not solve them all.
However, it is at least arguable that, in its present form, once the
amendment is ratified, the language of the last sentence of Senate
Joint Resolution 35 may render the understanding of no effect, since,
read literally, it may be interpreted as meaning that even before im-
plementing legislation is enacted, only Congress shall establish the
method for determining the commencement and termination of the
inability.. This would be a most unfortunate result which I am quite
sure the authors of the proposal do not intend.
The primary purpose of the last sentence is to confer broad dis-
cretion on the Congress to deal chiefly with the unusual situations
such as where the President and Vice President have reached an im-
passe, or an atomic attack or like holocaust prevents communication
and agreement between the President and Vice President. I think
that this intention would be reflected more clearly if the word "shall"
after "ability" in line 15, page 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 35 were
changed to "may." There would then be no question but that the
existing understanding between President Kennedy and Vice Presi-
dent Johnson, which is identical to the understanding between Presi-
dent Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon has been left unimpaired
and that it will remain operative until Congress passes implementing
legislation.
I recognize, as was observed before, that there are eminent states-
men and constitutional scholars who are of the opinion that Congress
has power to act in this matter under the "necessary and proper"
clause (article I, section 8, clause 18), that a statute would there-
fore suffice as a solution to the presidential inability problem, and
moreover, that enactment of a statute is to be preferred because it
would likely take less time than the ratification of an amendment.
On the other hand, there is equally distinguished authority, includ-
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ing the opinions of former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers
as well as Attorney General Kennedy, that the only definitive method
of settling what problems remain despite present arrangements is a
constitutional amendment. While the current understanding be-
tween the President and the Vice President does resolve the major
problems in my judgment, it cannot resolve all problems which
would conceivably arise, unlikely as they appear to be. For example,
some observers have theorized as to the possibility of disagreement
between a President and a Vice President as to the existence of
inability-both as to when it has begun and when it has ended.
There remain for discussion Senate Joint Resolution 84 and Senate
Joint Resolution 28. Senate Joint Resolution 84 is similar to Senate
Joint Resolution 35 except that it expressly imposes the limitation
on Congress that in establishing a procedure to determine the in-
ability of a President to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, such procedure-
must be compatible with the maintenance of the three distinct departments
of Government * * * and the preservation of the checks and balances be-
tween the coordinate branches.
While I am wholly sympathetic with the sentiment which has
prompted the recommendation, I do not believe it is necessary or de-
sirable. For one thing, it expresses a principle which already per-
vades, and is inherent in, the Constitution. To include this prin-
ciple in merely one section of one article of the Constitution may
open the door to the argument that the principle no longer applies
to other portions of the Constitution. Moreover, in its specific con-
text, the limitation on the Congress is quite elusive and may be sus-
ceptible of varying interpretations and accompanying confusion.
Then again, if the method adopted by Congress for determining
Presidential inability does not meet the standards of the separation
doctrine or preserve the system of checks and balances between the
coordinate branches, the President may veto the bill, and his veto,
as already noted, could only be overridden by two-thirds of each
House. It seems most unlikely, therefore, that any bill dealing with
the matter of Presidential inability could ever be enacted which did
not afford adequate protection under the separation doctrine.
I now turn to the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 98.
Sections 1 and 2 of this proposal are similar in their effect to the first
two sentences of Senate Joint Resolution 35. At this point, marked
differences between the two proposals appear. Section 3 of Senate
Joint Resolution 28 deals with cases in which the President is unable
or unwilling to declare his own inability. In that event, the Vice
President with the written approval of a majority of the heads of
the executive departments in office, would assume the discharge of
the powers and duties of the Office of Acting President. Section 4
covers the situation of a disagreement between the President and
Vice President as to whether the inability has ended. The Presi-
dent would be permitted to resume the powers and duties of his Office
by making a public announcement that his inability has ended.
This he could do on the seventh day after making the public an-
nouncement. But Congress would be called on immediately, whether
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in session or not t to resolve the question of presidential inability
if objection is raised in writing by the Vice President, supported
by a majority of the heads of executive departments in office at
the time of the President's announcement. In that event, Congress
would decide the issue. If two-thirds of the Members present in
each House acting by concurrent resolution determined that the
President's inability had not terminated, the Vice President would
continue to serve as Acting President. The President could, how-
ever, thereafter resume the powers and duties of his Office either
if the Vice President proclaimed that the President's inability had
ended, or Congress, by a majority of the Members present in each
House, determined, by concurrent resolution, that the President's
inability had come to an end.
It is true that the procedure embodied in section 4 of Senate
Joint Resolution 28 has definite advantages over the impeachment
process. For one thing, of course, presidential inability could
scarcely fall into the category of a high crime or misdemeanor for
which impeachment lies under the Constitution. In addition, under
section 4 the stigma of impeachment would probably be absent. Of
greater consequence, impeachment would bar the President from
returning to office after his disability ceased. Moreover, impeach-
ment proceedings could be carried on only if Congress were in
session.
While the procedure under Senate Joint Resolution 28 is intended
to avoid the stigma of impeachment, it may, however, be inter-
preted by the people in that light. Apart from the wisdom of load-
ing the Constitution down by writing detailed procedural and sub-
stantive provisions into it has been questioned by many scholars
and statesmen. The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom
of using broad and expanding concepts and principles that could
be adjusted to keep pace with current needs. The chances are that
supplemental legislation would be required in any event. In addi-
tion, crucial and urgent new situations may arise in the changing
future-not covered by Senate Joint Resolution 28-where it may
be of importance that Congress, with the President's approval,
should be able to act promptly without being required to resort to
still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Reso-
lution 35 makes this possible; Senate Joint Resolution 28 does not
Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circumstances in
which the presidential inability problem could arise, we are opposed to
any constitutional amendment which attempts to solve all these ques-
tions by a series of complex procedures. We think that the best solu-
tion to the basic problems that remain would be a simple constitu-
tional amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35, which treats
the contingency of inability differently from situations such as death,
removal, or resignation, which states that the Vice President in case
of presidential inability succeeds only to the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President and not to the office itself, and which de-
clares that the commencement and termination of any inability may
be determined by such methods as Congress by law shall provide.
Such an amendment would supply the flexibility which we think is
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indispensable and at the same time put to rest what legal problems
may exist under the present provisions of the Constitution as supple-
mented by practice and understanding.
Thank you.
Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach, for a scholarly,
thoughtful, clear, and explicit statement of the position of the
administration.
Do you wish to introduce the distinguished lawyer who is sitting
next to you
Mr. KATZENBACH. I am accompanied by Mr. Nathan Siegel, who is
an attorney in the Department of Justice, and who has worked on this
problem through two administrations.
Senator KEFAUVER. We are glad to have you, Mr. Siegel. We
know of your long and thoughtful work in this field. I have only
two observations, Mr. Katzenbach. I call Senator Keating's atten-
tion to this statenient on page 9, in which Mr. Katzenbach pointed out
that the present language of Senate Joint Resolution 35 might be in-
terpreted as meaning that agreement between the President and Vice
President could not continue after the passage or adoption of an
amendment, constitutional amendment, as envisaged by Senate Joint
Resolution 35.
He says, on page 9, "this would be a most unfortunate result which
I am quite sure the authors of the proposal do not intend." For my
part, as one of the sponsors of the bill, it was not intended that way.
Senator KEATINO. I certainly join the chairman in that statement.
It has not occurred to me that that was a possibility.
Senator KEFAUVER. I do think the suggestion of substituting,
"may" for "shall" as suggested by Mr. Katzenbach, probably should be
done, and we should certainly consider having it done.
Senator KEATINo. Page 2, line 15.
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, page 2, line 15.
Senator KEATINO. Right.
Mr. KATZENBACII. It now reads, "ability shall be determined by
such method as Congress * * *"
Senator KEATINO. I doubt whether that would be the effect of the
amendment; but, certainly, we ought to amend it to be sure that
the temporary agreement is not vitiated prior to the enactment of
the necessary legislation. If the Department's lawyers think that
change is needed, we certainly ought to make it.
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. I thought it well for us to point out our
intention for the legislative history.
The other matter, Mr. Katzenbach, is on page 4, in which you
suggest that page 2, lines 6 and 7, the words "as Acting President"
should be included after the words "Vice President."
My question is, Would that run contrary to the requirement that
bills and other state documents must be signed by the President?
Would there be any complication or difficulty there?
Mr. KATZENBACJI. I should think it would help clarify that rather
than conflict with it. Permit him to sign as Acting President, where
the present language and practice is for the President to sign all
such things. I would think that it would be helpful to have the
words "as Acting President."
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Senator KEFAUVER. The committee is very glad to have Congress-
man Wyman of New Hampshire with us. He has long been inter-
ested in this problem and will discuss it at a later time this
morning.
Senator Dirksen, do you have any questions?
Senator DIRKSEN. No.
Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Keating, do you have any questions?
Senator KEATINO. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend the Deputy Attorney General for a very
well reasoned statement, and appreciate his appearing here and
giving us the benefit of his views.
Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Fong, do you have any questions, sir?
Senator FoNo. I have nothing, Mr. Chairman, except that I feel
that the Attorney General has given us a very fine statement here.
I am inclined to go along with him to make it very simple and
not clutter up the Constitution.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Graham?
Mr. GRAHAM. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Flynn?
Mr. FLYNN. No; thank you.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Katzenbach, your statement seems to be
generally appreciated by the members of the committee, as you are
known to be an historian and able constitutional lawyer.
I am sure you and the President and other members of the execu-
tive realize the importance of acting upon problems like this, when
action on them may not be required, but when we know that pre-
paring for the future, for future contingencies, should be done at
a time when there is calm and no apparent necessity for it.
Mr. KATZENBAOH. That is true, Senator. I also think that the
scholars have written almost about as much on this as is possible and
very little more scholarly writing could be done. So, it is all right to
clarify it, without hurting scholarship.
Senator KEFAUVER. We are glad to have you with us, Mr. Siegel.
Thank you very much for coming.
The committee is very happy to have Congressman Wyman, Repre-
sentative of the State of New Hampshire, who has been interested
in this problem a long time and previously served as Attorney General
of New Hampshire; from 1953 to 1961 has served as President of
the American Association of Attorneys General and is now a member
of the Appropriations Committee of the House. Representative
Wyman is chairman of the Standing Committee on Jurisprudence of
the American Bar Association and as such, has devoted much study
to the problem of presidential inability.
Congressman Wyman, I have a copy of your bill, and we have
talked the matter over. This, of course, is not a subcommittee to act
on the bill, but we would like to have your bill, H.R. 1164, printed in
the record for reference.
We would like to have your thoughts, first in the event that Senate
Joint Resolution 35, or others authorizing the Congress to act, is
passed. In that event, it would be quite pertinent and helpful to
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have considered specific proposals. We are aware of the fact that
some lawyers feel that constitutional amendment may not be
necessary.
We appreciate having you with us. Will you proceed I
STATEMENT OF HON. LOUIS C. WYMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mr. WYMrAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee.
I will be very brief, because I know you are very busy and you have
heard a lot of testimony on this subject.
I felt that this was one hearing that I ought to attend.
In fact, I am obliged to attend because, in 1962, in February, the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association unanimously
adopted a resolution, recommended in a report of the standing com-
mittee on jurisprudence and law reform, of which I am chairman
that affirmed the position of the American Bar Association in favor of
a constitutional amendment. It also affirmed the need, and used lan-
guage with such words as "urgent," for an interim statutory enact-
ment, to cover the situation of what might happen in forseeable emer-
gencies; and the House also unanimously adopted a statutory recom-
mendation
Senator KEFAVUER. You are talking about the house of delegates?
Mr. WYMAN. Yes; which is the governing body and establishes
policy for the American Bar-which is the bill which you just
referred to, II.R. 1164.
I have the report and recommendations of our committee that
were acted upon in 1962, in February, with me; and, if I might,
I would like to hand it to the clerk that it might be incorporated
perhaps into the record. It is very brief. It is not an extensive
report.
Senator KEPAUVER. If there is no objection, it will be made part
of the record at the appropriate place, Congressman Wyman.
(The material above mentioned is as follows:)
V~~~~~'~~zyA: ';'  ~ jC ~ .
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SSTiI CONGRESS R 41H.. 1164
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 9, 16:3
Mr. Wvys int rodlced tile following bill; which wns referred to Iho Com-
mittee on tihe Judiciary
A BILL
To provide for the case of inability of the President or Vice
President or interim successor.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That the determination of whether the President, or any
4 individual acting as President, has an inability to discharge
5 the powers and duties of President shall be made as provided
6 by this Act.
7 SEc. 2. (a) If the President shall by message to Con-
8 gress announce that he has an inability to discharge the
9 powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall
10 he discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
I
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1 (b) If the President does not so announce but the
2 Vice President or person next in line of succession to the
3 President is satisfied that the President or person then Act-
4 ing President has such an inability, he shall give written
5 notification thereof to the Chairman and members of the
6 Commission provided for by section 3 of this Act. Upon
7 receipt of such written notification of Presidential inability
8 or upon its own motion whenever a majority of its member-
9 ship shall be of the opinion that there exists such Presidential
10 inability, the Commission shall forthwith convene and deter-
11 mine whether in its opinion the President or Acting Presi-
12 dent has an inability to discharge the powers and duties of
13 the said office. Notice and opportunity to be heard shall be
14 given to the President. If the Commission so determines,
15 the Chairman shall forthwith give written notice of its deter-
16 mination to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
17 to the President pro tempore of the Senate with a copy of
18 such written notification to the Vice President or person next
19 in line of succession to the Presidenoy. Upon receipt of this
20 written notice the Vice President or person next in line of
21 succession to the Presidency shall forthwith proceed to dis-
22 charge the powers and duties of the office of the President
23 pending final determination of the question of inability as
24 provided herein.
25 SEC. 3. (a) There is hereb, established a commission
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1 to be known as the Presidential Inability Commission, here-
2 inafter referred to as the "Commission". The Commission
3 shall be composed of the following members: (1) The Chief
4 Justice of the United States, who shall act as Chairman.
5 The Chairman shall have no vote in the proceedings of the
6 Commission except in the case of a tie. (2) The leader of
7 the House of Representatives of the political party having
8 the greatest number of Members of the House of Representa-
9 tives. (3) The leader of the House of Representatives of the
10 political party having the second greatest number of Mem-
11 bers of the House of Representatives. (4) The leader in
12 the Senate of the political party having the greatest number
13 of Members of the Senate. (5) The leader of the Senate
14 of the political party having the second greatest number of
15 Members of the Senate. (6) The Surgeon General of the
16 United States.
17 (b) Four members of the Commission shall constitute
18 a quorum and a concurrence in writing by at least four
19 members shall be required for any determination made by
20 the Commission.
21 (o) Members of the Commission shall serve as such
22 without compensation; but they shall be reimbursed for travel,
23 subsistence, and necessary expenses incurred by them in the
24 performance of their duties.
25 (d) The Chairman shall convene the Commission with-
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4
1 out delay upon receipt by him of a written notification from
2 the Vice President or person next in line of succession to the
3 Presidency provided by section 2 (b) or upon receipt by him
4 of a communication in writing from two members thereof
5 stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that the
6 President has an inability to discharge the powers and duties
7 of the office of the President.
8 SEO. 4. (1) Upon receipt of written notification from
9 the Commission of Presidential inability pursuant to section
10 2 (b) of this Act, the House of Representatives, if then in
11 session and if not at such time as it shall convene, shall
12 proceed forthwith by resolution adopted by a vote of the
13 majority of the Members of the House of Representatives
14 present and voting (providing a quorum is present), to re-
15 quest the Senate to take appropriate action to determine
16 whether the President has an inability to discharge the
17 powers and duties of his office. A copy of such resolution
18 shall, upon its adoption, be forwarded immediately to the
19 Chief Justice of the United States and to the Senate. If
20 the House shall fail to request the Senate as aforesaid, the
21 Clerk of the House shall immediately thereafter give writ-
22 ten notification to the person acting as President of such
23 fact and such person shall forthwith cease to discharge the
24 powers and duties of the President.
25 (2) Upon receipt of the copy of such resolution the
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5
1 Senate shall forthwith proceed to finally determine whether
2 the President has such inability to discharge the powers and
3 duties of his office. The Chief Justice of the United States
4 shall preside over the Senate throughout its deliberations
5 and the Vice President shall not participate therein. Notice
6 and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the President.
7 (3) If the Senate determines, by a vote of two-thirds
8 of the Senate present and voting (providing a quorum is
9 present), that the President or the person acting as Presi-
10 dent has such inability to discharge the powers and duties
11 of his office, the Senate shall, by a resolution adopted by
12 the same two-thirds vote required to make such dctermina-
13 tion, direct the Vice President or person next in line of
14 succession to the Presidency to act as President during
15 the period of inability of the President or Acting President,
16 or until the end of the then current Presidential term. If
17 the Senate shall fail to so determine the existence of Presi-
18 dential inability, the Secretary of the Senate shall immedi-
19 ately give written notification to the person acting as
20 President of such fact and such person shall forthwith cease
21 to discharge the powers and duties of the President.
22 (4) Any determination made by the Senate under the
23 preceding paragraph may be revoked and the inability of
24 the President or the person acting as President which was
25 the basis of such determination may be declared to have
20-328 O - 63 - 4
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1 terminated by the Senate as in the case and manner of
2 the original determination. And in such event the Senate
3 shall by a resolution adopted by a. vote of two-thirds of
4 the Senate present and voting (providing a. quorum is
5 present) declare that the President is restored to the powers
6 and duties of the office of the President effective at such time
7 as may be provided by such resolution.
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[February 1962, No. 48]
AMERICAN BAB ASSocIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUBISPBUDENCE AND lAW
REFORM
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Presidential inability
That the house of delegates, adopt the following resolution with respect
to Presidential inability:
"Whereas statutory provision for succession to the powers and duties of
the Office of President of the United States, in the event of Presidential
Inability to discharge said powers and duties, is of vital public importance at
this time; and
"Whereas provisions for succession in such event should apply not only
to the Vice President but to any person next in line of succession to an Act-
ing President; and
"Whereas executive accords relating to such contingency between an incum-
bent President and Vice President can make no such provision: Now, there-
fore, be it
"Resolved, That the American Bar Association urgently recommends to
the Congress of the United States the enactment of statutory provision for
the contingency of Presidential inability by a statute which shall make pro-
vision substantially as follows:
" A BILL To provide for the case of Inability of the President or Vice President or Interim
successor
"'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled. That the determination of whether
the President, or any individual acting as President, has an inability to dis-
charge the powers and duties of President shall be made as provided by
this Act.
"'SEe. 2. (a) If the President shall by message to Congress announce that
he has an inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as acting President.
"'(b) If the President does not so announce but the Vice President or
person next in line of succession to the President is satisfied .that the President
or person then acting President has such an inability, he shall give written
notification thereof to the Chairman and members of the Commission provided
for by section 3 of this Act. Upon receipt of such written notification of
presidential inability or upon its own motion whenever a majority of its
membership shall be of the opinion that there exists such presidential in-
ability, the Commission shall forthwith convene and determine whether in
its opinion the President or acting President has an-inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the said office. If the Commission so determines, the
Chairman shall forthwith give written notice of its determination to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of
the Senate with a copy of such written notification to the Vice President
or person next in line of succession to the Presidency. Upon receipt of this
written notice the Vice President or person next in line of succession to the
Presidency shall forthwith proceed to discharge the powers and duties of the
Office of the President pending final determination of the question of inability
as provided herein.
"'SEC. 3. (a) There is hereby established a Commission to be known as thePresidential Inability Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission".
The Commission shall be composed of the following members: (1) The Chief
Justice of the United States, who shall act as Chairman. The Chairman
shall have no vote in the proceedings of the Commission except in the case
of a tie. (2) The leader of the House of Representatives of the political
party having the greatest number of members of the House of Representatives.(3) The leader of the House of Representatives of the political party having
the second greatest number of members In the House of Representatives. (4)The leader in the Senate of the political party having the greatest number
of members of the Senate. (5) The leader of the Senate of the political
party having the second greatest number of members of the Senate. (6)The Surgeon General of the United States.
~cap~. ,,
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"'(b) Four members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum and a
concurrence in writing by at least four members shall be required for any de-
termination made by the Commission.
"'(c) Members of the Commission shall serve as such without compensa-
tion; but they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence and necessary
expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties.
"'(d) The Chairman shall convene the Commission without delay upon
receipt by him of a written notification from the Vice President or person
next In line of succession to the Presidency provided by section 2(b) or
upon receipt by him or a communication in writing from two members thereof
stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that the President has an
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Office of the President,
"'SEo. 4. (1) Upon receipt of written notification from the Commission of
Presidential Inability pursuant to section 2(b) of this Act, the House of Repre-
sentatives, If then in session and if not at such time as it shall next convene,
shall proceed forthwith by resolution adopted by a vote of the majority of
the members of the House of Representatives present and voting (providing a
quorum is present), request the Senate to take appropriate action to determine
whether the President has an inability to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. A copy of such resolution shall, upon its adoption, be forwarded im-
mediately to the Chief Justice of the United States and to the Senate. If the
House shall fail to request the Senate as aforesaid, the Clerk of the House shall
immediately thereafter give written notification to the person acting as Presl-
dent of such fact and such person shall forthwith cease to discharge the powers
and duties of the President.
"'(2) Upon receipt of the copy of such resolution the Senate shall forthwith
proceed to finally determine whether the President has such Inability to dis.
charge the powers and duties of his office, the Chief Justice of the United
States shall preside over the Senate throughout its deliberations and the Vice
President shall not participate therein.
"'(3) If the Senate determines, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate present
and voting (providing a quorum is present), that the President or the person
acting as President has such inability to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Senate shall, by a resolution adopted by the same two-thirds vote
required to make such determination, direct the Vice President or person next
in line of succession to the Presidency, to act as President during the period of
inability of the President or acting President, or until the end of the then
current Presidential term. If the Senate shall fall to so determine the existence
of Presidential inability, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately give
written notification to the person acting as President of such fact and such
person shall forthwith cease to discharge the powers and duties of the
President.
"'(4) Any determination made by the Senate under the preceding para-
graph may be revoked and the Inability of the President or the person acting
as President which was the basis of such determination may be declared to
have terminated by the Senate as In the case of the original determination.
And in such event the Senate shall by a resolution adopted by a vote of two-
thirds of the Senate present and voting (providing a quorum Is present) de-
clare that the President is restored to the powers and duties of the Office of
the President effective at such time as may be provided by such resolution.'
"Further resolved. That the committee on jurisprudence and law reform
hereby is directed to advocate the introduction and adoption of such statute
by all appropriate means.
"Further resolved, That this resolution shall not be construed to modify the
heretofore expressed support of this body for appropriate constitutional amend-
ment relating to the same subject."
REPORT
1. PresIdential InabiltUy
In 1060 this committee recommended and the house of delegates authorized
this committee to support a constitutional amendment to section 1 of article II
of the Constitution In respect to presidential Inability. The proposed amendment
would clarify by change in constitutional language an uncertainty believed by
many to exist In present wording in respect to whether, in the event of presi-
dential Inability, a Vice President succeeds to the Office of President or merely
assumes the powers and duties of the office, and would expressly empower Con-
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gress to provide a mechanism for determining when presidential Inability begins
and when it ends.
The proposed amendment which is still a pending recommendation, does
not undertake to define inability. It has not been implemented by the
Congress.
As early as March 26 of 1957 the House Committee on the Judiciary
printed an analysis of reports to a questionnaire dealing with the subject 1
In April of 1957 the same committee took the testimony of the then Attorney
General of the United States and printed a number of proposals dealing
with the subject*
In January and February of 1958 further hearings were held by the Senatj
Committee on the Judiciary, at which the views of a number of witnesses
were expressed with considerable detail.'
On August 2, 1961, the present Attorney General rendered an opinion
to the present President to the effect that in his opinion the Vice President
determines the President's inability, saying in part "* * * It is the Vice
President, if the President is unable to do so, who determines the Presidential
Inability and (that) it is the President who asserts when the inability has
ceased." This opinion related to a review of "the understanding between
the President and the Vice President" which was approved by the present
Attorney General (as well as by his predecessor in relation to a previous
administration) as constituting a partial practical solution to the problem
of Presidential inability.
Section I of article II of the Constitution provides:
"In Case of the Removal of th President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by law provide for the case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Offcer shall then
Act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected." ,[Emphasis supplied.]
Review of substantial testimony, opinions, and memorandums relating to this
subject discloses fundamental differences of opinion between scholars, teachers,
public officials, and others, as to whether a constitutional amendment is neces-
sary before Congress can make provision for the contingency of an inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency on the part of an
Incumbent.
This committee is uanlmously of the opinion that in this day and time
statutory provision for such succession is of urgent importance and should be
enacted without delay; more particularly, without the delay attendant upon
the process of constitutional amendment. Even those who favor consti-
tutional amendment concede the desirability of statutory enactment and the
uncertainty as to whether constitutional amendment Is required. That an
inability is not necessarily confined to physical affliction or mental Incapacity
only broadens the depth of need for statutory provision of the type here
proposed.
Many suggestions have been offered. Executive agreements existed between
the predecessor President and Vice President as they do between the present
incumbents However, this committee feels strongly that a subject of such
fundamental importance should not be left to executive agreement between two
individuals, regardless of their high office, No such agreement can apply to
persons in line of succession to the Presidency, nor can such agreements have
the force of law.
Accordingly, having reviewed at length various congressional proposals
and individual recommendations in this field, your committee unanimously rec-
commends that the American Bar Association propose to Congress and
authorize this or other committees of the association to vigorously support a
specific statutory enactment substantially in the form of the bill which is
appended to this report. This bill would achieve several objectives without
SHouse committee print, 85th Cong., 1st seas., "Presidential Inability," Committee onJudiciary, Mar. 26, 1957.SHearing before Special Subcommittee on Study of Presidential Inability, serial No. 8,Apr. 1. 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.
* Pre'ldential Inability hearings before Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.Senate Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 24, Feb. 11, 14, 18, and 28, 1958.
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unreasonable interference with the Executive or with the proper prerogatives
and functions of Congress.
Concisely, it provides that in the event of Presidential inability, when the Pres-
ident does not himself proclaim the existence of same by message to Congress,
the Vice President may bring the possibility to the attention of an unpaid
Commission (which can also act on its own initiative) which shall then forth-
with proceed to make a tentative determination of the existence or non.
existence of such Inability. If the Commission is of the opinion that such
Inability exists, its Chairman is then required to notify the Speaker of the
House and President pro tempore of the Senate to this effect, with a copy to
the Vice President. This copy Is the Vice President's authority and directive
to discharge the powers and duties of the Office of President (but not to assume
the Office itself) until the Presidential term ends or the inability is ended or
there should be a failure of either House of Congress to take the steps re-
quired by the bill, which are simply that the House by majority vote shall refer
the matter to the Senate for final determination. In the Senate a two-thirds
vote is required with the Chief Justice of the United States presiding without a
vote. If either House of Congress should fail In the required vote, its admin-
istrative officer shall so notify the Vice President, who shall then resume the
Vice Presidency. If an inability is finally found by the Senate by two-thirds
vote, its resolution shall provide that the Vice President shall continue to dis-
charge the powers and duties of the Office for duration of the inability or to the
end of the President's term, whichever is shorter. Should the Inability be con-
sidered to have terminated, It may be initiated and declared in the same
manner. If a Vice President should be reluctant to initiate a preliminary de-
termination of inability by the Commission, it may act on its own motion. The
Commission is comprised of six members, consisting of the Chief Justice of the
United States as Chairman, who shall have no vote unless there is a tie, the
majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate and the Surgeon General
of the United States. In this way no person in line of succession to the Presi-
dency participates In the proceedings, except for the Speaker of the House,
who deals with 400 direct Representatives of the people.
A solution is provided In this bill for the diffcult problem of an under-
standably reluctant Vice President, of acting rapidly and yet safely and of
empowering a Vice President to act as President pending final determination
of inability by the Congress, all of which makes a workable provision for the
direction and safety of the United States, Indispensable in the present era.
The bill also expressly applies to the Vice President and to any person next in
line of succession to a person acting as President.
It is recommended that the House adopt the proposed resolution as a matter
of fundamental and urgent importance in the public Interest.
Mr. WYMAN. We are for-and without receding from the position
taken in 1960--we are for a constitutional amendment, Mr. Chairman.
We think a constitutional amendment which says in simple
language that Congress may provide a method for determing
Presidential inability, its existence and its termination would be
a desirable clarification to the present language.
However, there is within our committee, as there are within schol-
ars in the field of constitutional law, great differences of opinion
as to whether this is necessary.
I have read with interest the analysis of Presidential inability in
the 85th Congress, 1st session, a document of the Committee on the
Judiciary in the House, and the hearings before your committee in
times past on Presidential enactment, including particularly those of
January 24 and February 11, 14, and 28, 1958.
Even there, it is possible to see that some think a constitutional
amendment is unnecessary, and some think it is; but all agree that it
is desirable and all agree that no harm can be done by a constitu-
tional amendment.
The Bar Association of the City of New York, through a learned
committee again reaffirmed this necessity last year. With all due
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respect to our committee's views the New York group deems a
constitutional amendment to be required.
We urge a constitutional amendment plus an interim statute.
But, the urgencies and the reason why I came over here to take
a little of your time today, and I have been to see you, Mr. Chair-
man, as you know, in my capacity for the bar association in years
before-
Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, Congressman Wyman. I remember our
visits with Mr. Taylor of the American Bar Association, and with
you on several previous occasions.
Mr. WYMAN. That's right, sir.
The urgency of the situation lies in the confusion that is implicit
in pacts and accords between a President and a Vice President as
to how there is to be a transition in the powers and duties of
the office, a devolution of the powers and duties to the Vice President,
as the Constitution provides, in the event of an inability of the
President. Most of these pacts or accords contemplate that the
President, himself, shall make declaration, such as "I am sick, I
am unable, you take over."
It is conceivable in this rather mixed-up and dangerous world that
we live in that circumstances might very well arise in which a Presi-
dent might not be able to say this, or there might be an extreme
difference of opinion between a President and a Vice President, or
even others, as to whether an inability so affects his power and
capacity as to result in the constitutional formula becoming appli-
cable.
Therefore, we have taken the position in the bar association
and the association recommends that a statute ought to be on the
books, so that if such a thing happens there will be a course of
action laid out in answer to the need, and we won't have a situation
where the Vice President is obviously and understandably, whether
it is of a Democratic Party or Republican Party, unwilling
to grasp for the power lest he give the impression of seeking to
take over.
In the same sense, we don't believe that the President's Cabinet, or
that anyone in line of succession to the Presidency, ought to be
on the Commission that determines the existence of inability; or,
if included, there ought to be just a very small minority on the
Commission, because this is so obviously controversial; and it is
very unlikely that members of a President's own team are going to
put him on the sidelines for an indefinite duration.
We have recommended the statute because we believe that the proc-
ess of constitutional amendment takes time and the statute should
cover the situation in the interim.
In whatever form a constitutional amendment is proposed, it will be
a long time before the legislatures of the necessary number of States
ratify it; although I think it will be ratified eventually.
I would like to demolish one criticism that has motivated the
thinking of those who take a dim view of the statutory interim solu-
tion that, if we have a statute then the constitutional amendment
will be considered no longer necessary.
This is obviously not true and this is not going to be of any
force and effect in the legislatures of the States.
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We need the constitutional amendment, but the country needs a
solution to this problem, so that there will never be a gap, a hiatus
in the transition of the executive powers and prerogatives that go
with the Presidency in critical times, in this atomic era, when an
hour or two might make all the difference.
The statute which the bar association has unanimously recom-
mended, may not be the statute in its final form as passed by the
Congress. The Commission membership, the method of determin-
ing the existence of an inability, the lack of necessity for Congress to
be in session to initiate the determination and to end it, the certificate
of the Vice President to assume the powers and duties of the Office,
the necessary number of votes in both Houses to initiate the deter-
mination and to end it, may be changed, but some statutory solu-
tion, as an interim procedure ought to be considered by this com-
mittee, I believe, as it passes upon the overall desirability of the
constitutional amendment.
I happen to be one of those who believe that the constitutional
language would authorize a statutory solution, without an amend-
ment but many feel otherwise.
Nevertheless, a vacuum is undeniably there. Whether or not, when
the President and Vice President are both unable, Congress may legis-
late as former Attorney General Brownell testified, only to provide
the line of succession, and not as to whether there is an inability;
when it commences and when it ends. Many disagree with this lim-
itation as I do.
There may well come a moment in national affairs when prompt
and decisive action to meet an emergency of presidential inability will
be in the public interest, and I think fhat there can be no question
about executive accord as not being the proper solution. Such ac-
cords cannot extend to others in line of succession to the presidency.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to give a few reasons why we,
of the bar association, believe that action is essential.
First, in the event of a presidential inability, the proposals which
have been made will clarify the procedural steps necessary to assure
a reasonable means of continuity in the powers and duties of the Pres-
ident, and without unnecessary delay.
Second, there would be provided a means to overcome the initial
inertia of a Vice President reluctant to act for fear, as I said, of an
inference that he is reaching for power.
Third, there is no requirement of a special session of the Congress,
should Congress be in recess at the incipiency of an inability.
Fourth, no problem is presented of self-interest in the composition
of the Commission authorized to make the initial and temporary de-
termination of the existence of presidential inability.
This is by virtue of the fact that no member thereof is in line of
succession to the Presidency and I might parenthetically say that I
think your proposals, Senate Joint Resolution 19, I think it was-
I don't remember the number, Mr. Chairman-I think you had the
whole Cabinet in a part of the picture of providing-
Senator KEFPAVEn. Senate Joint Resolution 28,I think.
Mr. WYMAN. Twenty-eight, sir-the whole Cabinet in the position
of passing upon a presidential determination of an inability, and that
troubled some of us because of the fact that all of the Cabinet are
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appointees of the President and might not be en rapporte to the same
extent and to the same degree with the Vice President.
This has happened before.
Fifth, it removed from the presidential family of appointees initial
responsibility for the declaration of inability, as well as the oppor-
tunity to unreasonably delay accession of a successor to the powers
and duties of the Office.
Here, I would like to call your attention to another possibility.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its original jurisdic-
tion, does not have the power to render advisory opinions, and there
is no way to know, in advance, whether or not a statutory interim
solution would be well or favorably received by the judiciary, yet
the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia probably
has jurisdiction of petitions in mandamus brought by the Attorney
General of the' United States, with consequent appellate jurisdiction
therefrom on this issue, in aiid to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Were such a petition to be brought, the district court de-
cision might quickly be sent to the High Court. Should there be
any doubts as to district court jurisdiction Congress could readily
so vest it provided it was believed to be desirable to have such a
question decided by the courts. This is within the power of Con-
gress, to this kind of issue, without constitutional amendment. Com-
pare Attorney General vs. Ta'gart in 69 N.H.
But, that is merely one of the alternatives.
Sixth. The interim statute would remove the opportunity for
private arrangements between a President and a Vice President
that can have no operable effect upon successors, acting Presidents
suddenly possessed of an inability of whatever type. It would
present to the Congress a practical solution to a great problem.
The American Bar Association is a great national nonpartisan
organization of lawyers. Its specific recommendations for enact-
ment in the current session of a statute plus proposing an amend-
ment consistent with the urgency of the problem. I have been di-
rected by the association, as chairman of the standing committee onjurisprudence and law reform, to appear before you and to urge
both favorable action upon your proposal for constitutional amend-
ment, that will clearly state that Congress may provide the method
of determining; and also for an interim statute.
Mr. Chairman, we conceive this as being of a most serious nature,
a most urgent problem.
The adoption of this constitutional amendment would follow, it
seems to me, in the legislatures of the various States, almost with-
out objection.
This recommendation is directly concerned with the safety and
security and very survival of the United States.
This is a problem which is of the most serious nature, because if a
Vice President were to claim to deal with the powers and duties
of the Office of President, without authority, application to the
courts for injunctive processes or other types of legal maneuvering
would take a long period of time, would cast a cloud over the
entire pattern of conduct; and might, in respect to debt obligations
in respect to executive appointments, and in respect to the busi-
ness and operations of the Government, create a situation that
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we ought to avoid now by taking a course of action and recom-
mending it for the consideration of the Congress.
Presidents in previous years and to date have had inabilities. The
risk is always present. We should be forehanded here for certainly
we have been forewarned.
There have been all kinds of situations, where it seems to me
that it is of the essence of the legislative processes, in the Con-
gress, to at least put on paper our direction to the executive branch
as to how to meet this very important problem, and also to recom-
mend to the legislatures a constitutional amendment that would
remove any doubt or any controversy whatsoever in respect to the
right of Congress and the power of the Congress to put the
statute on the books.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator K.FAUVER. Congressman Wyman, the constitutional
amendment that you recommend and speak of, I take it, is Senate
Joint Resolution 35, which is the resolution recommended by the
American Bar Association and by your committee of the bar associa-
tion. Is that correct?
Mr. WYMAN. That is correct.
Senator KEFrAUVE. We have another one along the same lines,
which was discussed by Mr. Katzenbach, Senate Joint Resolution 84
by Senators Hruska and McClellan, the only difference being, as I read
it, on page 2, line 13, there is this clause:
Such procedure must be compatible with the maintenance of the three dis.
tinct departments of Government, legislative, executive, and the judicial, and
the preservation of checks and balances between the Government and Its
branches.
Do you have an opinion about that, or what you think about Mr.
Katzenbach's testimony as to his feeling with respect to it.
Mr. WYMAN. I have not seen that, Mr. Chairman.
However, from just what I have heard, as you read it, I would
say it is merely a recitation of requirements that already exi in
the law. Perhaps it does no harm to recite them.
Senator KEPAUVER. Senator Dirksen, do you have any questions'
Senator DIRKSEN. That was a very interesting statement, but I
have no questions.
Senator KEFAUVER. r. Graham?
Mr. GRAHAM. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Flynn?
Mr. FLYNN. No questions.
Senator KEFAUVER. Congressman Wyman, I want to thank you
for a very intelligent and helpful statement on this problem.
Thank you for your continuing interest and for your willingness
to come over and give us again your viewpoint about the whole
matter.
Mr. WYMarN. Mr. Chairman, I trust you can understand that I am
acting under the resolution that I have offered for your considera-
tion.
Senator KEFAUVER . Yes. We have that resolution and it shall be
made part of the record. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Mr. Robert A. Koch, who is a member of
the committee on Federal legislation of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.
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We are happy to tell Mr. Koch th thtthe Association of the Bar
of the City of New York has been a great help to the various sub-
committees of the Judiciary Committee, and we hope that you
express our continuing appreciation to them.
Mr. Koch is a graduate of Harvard College class of 1944, and Yale
Law School, class of 1949. He is a member of the firm of Gasperini &
Koch, 375 Park Avenue New York City.
He is a member of the New York ity Bar Association commit-
tee on Federal legislation and participated in drafting the report
on Presidential inability that was adopted by the New York City
Bar Association in 1962.
We appreciate the taking of your time and effort to come down
and give us your testimony, and the position of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. We have the report of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the general
matter of Presidential inability. Notation of this, in the appendix
of the report, will be made at a proper place.
(The report referred to is printed in the appendix to the record.)
You may proceed, Mr. Koch.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. KOCH, MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE
ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OP NEW YORK
Mr. Koci. Thank you very much, Senators Kefauver and Keat-
We, of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ap-
preciate the invitation from this subcommittee to present our views
with respect to the problem of presidential inability.
As Senator Kefauver mentioned, I ani engaged in law practice in
New York City. I have been a member of the committee on Federal
legislation of the association of the bar for the past 3 years, and par-
ticipated in the preparation of this report which has been made a
part of the record.
This report was adopted by our committee in the winter of 1962 and
was submitted to ana approved by the members of the entire bar
association, in an annual meeting on May8, 1962.
The report of our committee discusses in detail the historical back-
ground of this problem, and finds that two principal questions are
unanswered by the present constitutional provisions.
The first is, Does the Office of the President, or do the powers and
duties of said office devolve upon the Vice President?
The second is, Who raises the question of inability and who makes
the determination as to the commencement and termination of in-
ability?
The position of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
is that the ambiguity in clause 5 of section 1 of article II of the Con-
stitution, when considered in the light of the seriousness of the prob-
lem of transfer of Presidential authority in a time of national or
personal crisis, makes it highly desirable that the Constitution be
amended so as to clarify to the extent possible the respective roles of
the President and the Vice President in the case of inability of the
President.
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Our association feels that the essentials of a constitutional amend.
ment are that it: One, confirm the established view that, upon the
removal of the President during office, or his death or resignation, the
Vice President actually becomes President.
Two: Reaffirm and clarify beyond any doubt, that in case of the
inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the
Office of President, the Vice President assumes only the powers and
duties of the office tnd not the office itself.
Three: Empower Congress to enact legislation for determining
when inability commences and when it terminates.
The association believes that the establishment of the procedure for
determining when inability commences and the system of restora-
tion would best be left to enactment by Congress, subject to the veto
power of the President contained in clause 2 of section 7 of article
I of the Constitution.
We believe that constitutional amendments should not be overly
detailed, and future contingencies in the operation of the imple-
mentation of the constitutional mandate, not now presently fore-
seeable, should be left to the good judgment of Congress and the
President; that is, a majority of both Houses and Presidential ap-
proval or a two-thirds vote of both Houses overriding a Presidential
veto.
I have read the testimony of Mr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., president-
elect nominee of the American Bar Association, and of Mr. Martin
Taylor, chairman of the committee on Federal constitution of the
New York State Bar Association, on behalf of that organization, and
concur with their views in support of the Senate Joint Resolution 85.
I also heard, and to the extent that I had an opportunity, studied
the testimony of the Deputy Attorney General of the United States
this morning and am in agreement with his testimony to the effect
that a constitutional amendment in the area of presidential inability,
in the formula now contained in Senate Joint Resolution 35, would
be highly desirable.
The problem of presidential inability has been given a great deal
of attention by Members of Congress, by bar associations, by lawyers
and legal scholars within the past few years, and the almost uni-
versal conclusion seems to be that this is an area where consti-
tutional clarification would be highly desirable.
I would say, from my experience and the experience of the mem-
bership of our committee, that they felt more impressed with the
need for a constitutional amendment in this area, the more they
studied the problem and also felt strongly that it would be better
to deal with the problem of presidential inability in a context apart
from the tremendous pressures created by the illness or disability
of a particular President.
Thank you very much.
Senator KEPAUVER. Mr. Koch, by your last sentence, you mean
that, if we have to deal with it when an inability really exists, it
makes it more complicated and difficult, and impractical.
Mr. KoCH. That is what I mean to say.
Senator KEPAUVER. You recommend Senate Joint Resolution 35,
which is the recommendation of the American Bar Association,
which Senator Keating and Senator Dirksen and I joined in spon-
soring in the last Congress.
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I read parts of the testimony of two previous witnesses, a clause
in Senate Joint Resolution 84, which was made on May 28 by Sen-
ators Hruska and McClellan. Do you have a copy of that?
Mr. KooH. I don't have one, but I believe from the discussion-
Senator KEPAUVER. I understand from Mr. Graham that Senator
Hruska asked that the record be left open for 24 hours. We will
leave it open for 1 week for Senator Hruska's or any other statement.
Do you have Senate Joint Resolution 84, and the part referred is
the clause beginning on line 13 and ending on line 17:
Such procedure must be compatible with the maintenance of the three distinct
departments of government, the legislative, the executive, and the Judicial and
the preservation of the checks and balances between the coordinate branches.
Would you give us your opinion about that, Mr. Koch
Mr. Koon. Senator, I would hesitate to pose as a constitutional
expert, but I think I would agree with the testimony of the Deputy
Attorney General that it creates an unnecessary confusion in the
Constitution to put language like this into one amendment.
I think it leaves open the question of whether this language is
also not applicable to other amendments, and then I think you also
might run into a problem that someone would say that the statutory
procedure was not constitutional, and you would, in effect, create
a really whole new set of problems.
I think the spirit of the sentence is something that we would all
agree with, but I think, as a practical matter, there would be prob-
lems in introducing this into the Constitution.
Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you, Mr. Koch, for your observation.
You heard the colloquy between the Deputy Attorney General and
Senator Keating and myself, with reference to the legislative intent
as to the passage and adoption of the amendment contemplated by
Senate Joint Resolution 85 to upset any agreement that had been
entered into between the President and the Vice President, and the
Deputy Attorney General's suggestion is that, on page 2, line 15,
the word "shall" be changed to "may."
Do you agree.with that
Mr. Kocu. I would think that would be a desirable change. I
wouldn't think that you would want an amendment to cast doubt
on the President's existing arrangements.
Senator KEFAUVER. It was not our intention, and I am sure it was
not the intention of the American Bar Association.
Mr. Koon. I am sure it was not.
Senator KEPAUVER. Senator Keating, do you have any questions?
Senator KEATINO. No, I have no questions. I want to express
my appreciation to Mr. Koch and the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York for the great help that they have been and
for the work that they have done in this area. The very splendid
report which we were furnished in May 1962, and this testimony
you have given, have been of tremendous assistance.
You have been very helpful, and the association has made a con-
tribution in this field in the finest traditions of the bar.
Mr. Kocu. Thank you, sir. 1 would like to say also that the
association of the bar gets tremendous help, not only from the Sen-
ators from New York but the other Senators and their staffs, and
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I think the communication that has grown up, in terms of docu-
ments and information, is certainly most helpful to all of us.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Graham, do you have any questions
Mr. GRAHAM. No, sir.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Flynn?
Mr. FLYNN. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Koch, we appreciate your coming down.
Will you express our appreciation to the Bar Association of the
City of New York. Thank you very much.
I have received a letter from former Vice President Richard M.
Nixon, in which he regrets that he could not be here to testify. Mr.
Nixon requests that the discussion of presidential inability in his
book "Six Crises," be printed in the record, to express his views.
(The passages from "Six Crises" are printed as exhibit No. 4 in
the appendix.)
Senator KEFAUVER. As far as I know, other than the desire of Sen-
ator Hruska to submit a statement, I know of no one else who wishes
to ask to testify.
Mr. Graham, do you have any other questions?
Mr. GRAHAM.r No, sir.
Senator KEFAUVER. I think that the whole problem has been very
well canvassed and discussed, both in previous conferences and this
one.
We will leave the record open for a week, if necessary, in order to
receive Senator Hruska's statement.
I direct that the record be printed as quickly as possible, so that we
can take some action on this important problem.
(The statement of Senator Hruska follows:)
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMAN Is. HRUSKA TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 84
As I indicated at the time Senate Joint Resolution 84 was introduced, this
measure adheres to the basic provision of the bar association proposal, deviating
from It in only one respect. However, this one difference could avoid a good
deal of confusion. By delineating that any method adopted by the Congress
to determine presidential disability must be compatible with the maintenance
of the traditional balance between our three governmental departments, Senate
Joint Resolution 84 gives an essential guideline to the Congress in enacting
implementing legislation.
One might ask why such a guideline is necessary? Isn't it implied in the bar
association proposal?
A guideline Is necessary because of the extreme divergence of views and the
multiplicity of ideas concerning the method for determining presidential
inability. If there were not so many proposals on method, and if they were
not so varied In their approach, the danger of upsetting the balance of power
between the departments would be much less.
But, Mr. Chairman, the variety of proposals has been quite astounding and it
is this great variance in approach that has made the whole problem so difficult
to analyze. It was the great difference of opinion on the method which con.
tributed substantially to the defeat of the Elsenhower proposals which, it will be
recalled, sought to incorporate a method into the amendment. With the sug-
gestions running from the ridiculous to the conceivable, but none of them to the
sublime, a guideline would be helpful to the Congress.
The suggested guideline here would insure against placement of the de-
termination machinery exclusively in either the legislative or judicial
branches. And, I must remind you, there have been proposals offered in
previous Congresses which would have accomplished just that. Adoption
of such a method would give either the legislative or judicial branches a
convenient alternative to impeachment on the one hand, and on the other,
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would impose on the court a nonjudicial function and thrust it into politics.
As Mr. Hansen pointed out last week when he testified before the subcom-
mittee, the experience with members of the Court on the Electoral Com-
mission of 1876 has shown such proposals to be unwise.
In response to the question as to whether or not the guideline offered in
Senate Joint Resolution 84 Is implied in the bar proposal, the answer is that
we should not rely on an implication when we have it in our power to clarify
the issue by addition of a few simple words. One might also conclude from
the fact the separation of powers doctrine Is implied in the bar association
proposal that its supporters feel Its inclusion is desirable.
Moreover, it was a reliance on the wording of the original disability clause
and the implication that the Vice President would act as President in cases
of Inabilty which gave rise to the Tyler precedent and an interpretation com-
pletely alien to the original Intent of the drafters of the clause. That expe-
rience must not be overlooked in wording this amendment. We must not
rely on implication but concise wording.
The reasons behind Senate Joint Resolution 84 and the guideline proposed
therein evolved from a painstaking examination of the history and experience
with our present inability provision. This proposal is not the innovation of
any one person. In devising this clause, as Mr. Hansen pointed out in his
testimony, the drafters were guided, in great part,.by, the writings of Presi-
dents Hoover, Truman, and Elsenhower. Those writing are cited in Mr.
Hansen's statement.
This problem is so complicated and the task facing the Congress in adopting
an appropriate method is so Intricate that I feel any guidelines which can
be given will be welcome and will tend to lessen the burden placed upon us.
I sincerely hope the subcommittee will act favorably on Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 84 and report it out to the full Judiciary Committee for consideration.
Senator KEFAUVER. We will stand in recess, subject to further call
of the committee.
(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m. the committee was adjourned.)

APPENDIXES
EXHIBIT No. 1
Excerpt From the Reports of Committees of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York Concerned With Federal Legislation, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 51-74, May
1962.1
A Report on
The Problem of Presidential Inability*
By THE COMMIrrEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
There presently exists a defect in the Constitution of the
United States relating to the inability of the President to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office. This inability may
come about because of serious illness, as it has in the past, or
some other emergency. In the present day and age, the serious
consequences of such an occurrence cannot be stressed too
strongly. In the opinion of the Committee, action should be
taken to clarify the Constitution and thereafter to enact legisla-
tion dealing with the problem, prior to the advent of some future
Presidential inability. This report discusses the problem and re-
commends a Constitutional amendment relating thereto.
BACKGROUND
Clause 5 of Section i of Article II of the Constitution reads as
follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected."
It is well settled by precedent that in case of removal, death
or resignation of the President, the Vice President succeeds to
the presidential office and not just to the "powers and duties of
that office." 1
What happens, however, in the event that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office is not
*This report and the resolutions proposed by the Committce were approved
by the Association at the Annual Meeting held on May 8, 1962.
1 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 51-58 (1957); Opinion
of Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy, Aug. 2, 1961 (42 Op. No. 5,17-18).
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clear. Two principal questions are unanswered by the present
Constitutional provision, namely:
First, does the "Office" of the President, or do the "Powers and
Duties of said Office," "devolve" upon the Vice President?
Second, who raises the question of "Inability" and who makes
the determination as to the commencement and termination of
"Inability"?
As to the first question, several times in United States history,
when the President has been seriously incapacitated, the question
of whether the "Office" of President, or the "Powers and Duties
of the said Office," "devolve on the Vice President" has been
forcibly raised. Does a determination of inability affect the Office,
or the Powers and Duties of the Office, and does the Vice Presi-
dent, if he assumes the Powers and Duties of the Office, do so
on a temporary basis, or on a permanent basis, thus displacing or
ousting the President? The problem indeed is aggravated by the
precedent above referred to, which has been established by seven
Vice Presidents who upon the death of the President then in
office assumed not only the powers and duties of the office of
President but also the office itself. In view of the language of the
clause, the question has been raised whether the same result will
not occur upon the inability of the President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, namely, that the Vice President
will then assume the office of the President, and the President
will be ousted. Although the records of the debates of the Found-
ing Fathers demonstrate that this was not their intention, never-
theless the precedents established by the seven Vice Presidents
upon the death of the President then in office, the language of
the clause, and the reluctance of Vice Presidents Arthur and
Marshall to act when Presidents Garfield and Wilson were in-
capacitated because of the fear that by such assumption of the
powers and duties of the presidency they would be ousting the
President,2 has led to a constitutional ambiguity which should
be clarified. Historians believe that our Government has suffered
2 Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. Det. L.J. 39, 169 (1957).
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in the past as a result of this ambiguity. Certainly the original
understanding of the framers of the Constitution that only the
powers and duties of the President passed to the Vice President
upon the inability of the President could be set forth in the Con-
stitution, and it would seem that the present Congressional Ses-
sion affords an excellent opportunity to clarify this constitutional
defect.
The second question-who decides whether "Inability" exists
and when "Inability" begins and ends-has received conflicting
answers from scholars and others,3 none of them wholly satis-
factory. Indeed the very fact that there is so much disagreement
among the best informed underscores the need for constitutional
clarification. The majority of scholars seem to believe that the
Vice President has the power to determine when Presidential
inability exists; some, however, argue that Congress has the
power; and others argue that the Constitution is entirely am-
biguous. It is contended that the President himself determines
when his inability has ended and thereupon reclaims his powers.
If such interpretation is correct, however, what happens in the
unhappy circumstance that the President is mentally incapaci-
tated and in that state might attempt to reclaim his powers is a
question to which no satisfactory answer has been given.4
This Committee has studied the question and concluded that
the only permanent and final solution to the problem is a Con-
stitutional amendment enacted by Congress and submitted to
the States, amending Clause 5 of Section i of Article II. Such
Constitutional amendment should eliminate the ambiguity and
confer upon Congress the power, in general terms, to establish a
system of determining when inability commences and when it
terminates. The Committee further believes that promptly after
the adoption of such amendment Congress should enact legisla-
tion (i) providing a method to determine when inability com-
mences; and (ii) establishing a procedure whereby the President,
8 The divergent views are summarized in the Opinion of the Attorney General,
Note i, supra, at pp. 2o-23.
4 Fortunately for the country, this has never happened on the national level,
but not long ago Louisiana faced the problem with respect to its Governor. See
Gasperini, The Presidential Inability Riddle, 1S N.Y. State Bar Bulletin, 258 (1959).
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if and when he recovers from his inability, may resume the pow-
ers and duties of the office of President. Throughout the period
of inability, however, the President should retain the office of
President and the Vice President should serve only as Acting
President.
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
AND INCUMBENT VICE PRESIDENT
On March 3, 1958, President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon established a precedent by publishing a memorandum of
agreement between them as follows:
"The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following
procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article a,
Section i, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability. They
believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves
only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are con-
sistent with its present provisions and implement its clear intent.
"l. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform
the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting President,
exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability has ended.
"2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from
communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such con-
sultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide
upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve
as Acting President until the inability had ended.
"3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the office."
On August to, g961, the White House announced that an
agreement identical to the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement had
been made between President Kennedy and Vice President John-
son.6 The White House statement also said:
"After consultation with the Attorney-General, it is the understanding of
the President and the Vice President that these procedures reflect the correct
interpretation to be given to Article II, Section i, Clause 5 of the Constitu-
tion. This was also the view of the prior Administration and is supported by
the great majority of constitutional scholars."
5 New York Times, August it, 1961.
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Released at the same time was an opinion of Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy0 which approved the Kennedy-Johnson agree-
ment as "clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a prac-
tical solution to the problem as is possible."
It seems clear that in the event of inability of the present Presi-
dent this Memorandum would be construed as establishing a pro-
cedure by which the powers and duties of the office of President
would be assumed by the Vice President until the inability had
ended. The determination as to the ending of the inability would
be at the sole discretion of the President. The Memorandum
notes that the procedures "are intended to apply to themselves
only" and thus would not appear to be binding upon future
incumbents of the office of President and Vice President.
A serious defect in the "agreement approach" is that
"It does not provide for a system of final determination of inability by
anyone other than the President, in the event that the President is actually
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, but believes other-
wise."
Numerous arguments have been put forward in opposition to
the view that an agreement of this sort should be looked upon
as the "last word" in answer to the problem, but probably the
most forceful argument is that if the agreement were challenged
at a time when it was to be implemented, a serious conflict would
arise "at the very time when clear-cut procedure was vitally
necessary." 8
Accordingly, while the Kennedy-Johnson agreement may be
looked upon favorably as a temporary measure, in the opinion
of the Committee a Constitutional amendment and implement-
ing legislation to govern cases for the future are necessary.
6 Note i, supra.
7 Note 4, supra, at 264.
8 Martin Taylor, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Constitution of the
New York State Bar Association, New York Law Journal, September i , 1961. The
Committee of which Mr. Taylor is chairman has been very active in pressing for
a Constitutional amendment to deal with the problem.
65
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WITHOUT
PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
This Committee has carefully considered whether a statutory
approach to the problem without a prior Constitutional amend.
ment expressly empowering Congress to legislate is desirable.
The Committee's conclusion is that such an approach is unde-
sirable, in the light of the lack of agreement as to whether Con-
gress under the present Constitutional provision has the power
to enact such legislation. 9 Any action taken should be permanent
and legally unassailable.
This Committee agrees with the view of former Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell who stated: 10
"Ordinary legislation would only throw one more doubt into the picture,
for the statute's validity could not be tested until the occurrence of the
presidential inability, the very time at which uncertainty must be precluded."
The argument that the process of Constitutional amendment
involves a long delay is not persuasive: when there is agreement
on the need for a Constitutional amendment, speedy action can
be taken. As pointed out by former Attorney General Brownell:11
" * * * History shows, * * 0, that a constitutional amendment can be
speedily effected when the objective to be obtained is a popular one, if, of
course, Congress is disposed to act in the first place. The seventeenth amend-
ment, providing for the election of senators by popular vote, took thirteen
and a half months. The twenty-first amendment, repealing the eighteenth
(prohibition) amendment, took less than ten months. Woman's suffrage, the
nineteenth amendment, required only fifteen months, and the twenty-second
amendment, limiting Presidents to two terms, was ratified in eleven months.
These periods may be compared with the five years it took Congress to
enact a new statute establishing the sequence of presidential succession after
the Vice President."
There is also the likelihood that if Congress did enact a statute
prior to a Constitutional amendment it would make more diffi-
cult the eventual achievement of an amendment to the Federal
9 Note 3, supra.
10 Brownell, Presidential Inability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment,
68 Yale L.J. 189, so5 (1958).
11 Id. at 2o6-2o7.
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Constitution, because Congress and the public would be lulled
into the erroneous belief that the problem had been solved.
ESSENTIALS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The essentials of a Constitutional amendment are that it:
1. Confirm the established view that upon the removal of the
President from office, or his death or resignation, the Vice Presi-
dent actually becomes President;
2. Reaffirm and clarify beyond any doubt that in case of the
inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of
the office of President, the Vice President assumes only the pow.
ers and duties of the office, and not the office itself; and
8. Empower Congress to enact legislation for determining
when inability commences and when it terminates.
This Committee believes that the establishment of the pro.
cedure for determining when inabilitycommences and the system
of restoration would best be left to enactment by Congress, sub.
ject to the veto power of the President contained in Clause 2 of
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution. Constitutional amend-
ments should not be overly detailed, and future contingencies
in the operation of the implementation of the Constitutional
mandate, not presently foreseeable, should be left to the good
judgment of Congress and the President, i.e., a majority of both
houses and Presidential approval or a two-thirds vote of both
houses overriding a Presidential veto.
In the light of the above criteria, pending proposals for a
Constitutional amendment will be reviewed.
PROPOSAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
The Committee on Federal Constitution of the New York
State Bar Association, in its report of December 31, 1958, recom-
mended a Constitutional amendment to read as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office or of his Death or
Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President. In Case of
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the Inability of the President to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the said Powers and Duties shall devolve on the Vice President, until
the Inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide for the Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then be President, or in case of
Inability, act as President, and such Officer shall be or act as President
accordingly, until a President shall be elected or, in case of Inability, until
the Inability shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination
of any Inability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by
law provide." 12
The Committee on Federal Constitution stated:
" * * * it is felt by this Committee that a Constitutional Amendment is
necessary, and that the Amendment should provide in substance:
(a) That the commencement and termination of any inability should be
determined by such method as Congress shall by law provide; and
(b) In case of the Inability of the President, that the Vice President should
succeed only to the powers and duties of the office and not to the office
itself."
It endorsed as "second best" to its proposed Constitutional
amendment, S.J. Resolution 161 (1958) (introduced in substan-
tially the same form in 1961 as S.J. Resolution 19 and H.J.
Resolution 529, Appendix 3). The reason S.J. Resolution 161
was "second best" was stated by that Committee as follows:
"S.J. Res. 161 specifies the method and machinery for determining the
commencement and termination of disability. This precludes leaving to
Congress the details which might have to be changed in the future because
the method selected proved to be unsatisfactory. S.J. Res. 161 appears to us
to be preferable, however, to other methods that have been suggested."
The Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion on January 29, 1959, adopted the following resolutions:
"Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Executive Committee of the
New York State Bar Association hereby recommends that the present pro.
visions of the Constitution of the United States dealing with the death,
resignation, removal or inability of the President (Article II Section 1,
Clause 5) be amended so that (i) the commencement and termination of
any inability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by law
provide and (2) the Vice President, in case of the inability of the President,
12 Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting and Committee Reports for 1958,
N.Y. State Bar Assn. (1959), o14-o18. Sec Appendix I. A proposal for an amendment
in that form is contained in H.J. Res. 7, Appendix 2.
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shall succeed only to the powers and duties of the office and not to the office
itself;
"FURTHER RESbLVED, that said Report of this Association's Committee on
Federal Constitution is hereby approved and adopted, including the text of
the proposed Constitutional Amendment therein set forth, and including
the determination of said Committee that S.J. Res. 161 introduced in the
Senate March 4, 1958 by Senator Kefauver and bi-partisan sponsors (pro-
posing a Constitutional Amendment which lays down a detailed method
and machinery for determining the commencement and determination of
disability) is favored as second best to said Committee's proposal and as
preferable to other methods that have been suggested.
In both the proposed Constitutional amendment of the Com-
mittee on Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation (H.J. Res. 7) and S.J. Resolution 19, it is made clear that
the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon the
Vice President in the event of the inability of the President and
not the office itself, i.e., the Vice President does not assume the
office of President but solely the powers and duties thereof. This
Committee endorses a Constitutional amendment making this
clear.
The proposal of the Committee on Federal Constitution there.
after delegates to Congress the responsibility for enacting legis-
lation dealing with the determination of the commencement and
termination of inability. This Committee concurs with that re-
commendation allowing Congress to deal by law with the determi-
nation of the commencement and termination of inability. Such
initial legislation would have to have the approval of the Presi-
dent or be enacted by a two-thirds vote of each House. Repeal
or modification would also be subject to the same safeguards.
Thus, the possibility of considerations other than the President's
inability entering into the determination would be greatly re-
duced, if not entirely eliminated.
PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING
COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW REFORM
In 196o, the above Committee recommended and the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved a Con-
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stitutional amendment providing that in the event of Presiden-
tial inability, a Vice President assumes the powers and duties of
the Presidential office, not the office itself, and expressly empow-
ering Congress to provide a mechanism for determining when
Presidential inability begins and when it ends. That position
was the same as this Committee took in 1959 and which is re-
affirmed in this Report."
The ABA Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform recommended to the House of Delegates, and the latter
approved, at its mid-winter meeting in February, 1962, the enact.
ment of a statute by Congress dealing with Presidential inability,
but a further resolution of the Standing Committee and the
House of Delegates was to the effect that the call for legislation
was not to be "construed to modify the heretofore expressed sup.
port of this body for appropriate constitutional amendment re-
lating to the same subject."
Thus, should this Association approve this Committee's rec-
ommendations contained in this Report, the American Bar Asso-
ciation, the New York State Bar Association and this Association
will be in accord with respect to the desirability of a Constitu-
tional amendment dealing with the problem of Presidential
inability.
PROPOSALS DEALING WITH PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
INTRODUCED IN THE 87TH CONGRESS 14
A number of proposals dealing with Presidential inability have
been introduced in the 87th Congress which have been consid-
ered by the Committee.
H.J. Resolution 33 (Celler) proposes a Constitutional amend-
ment providing that (i) the Vice President assumes the powers
and duties of the Presidential office (i) if the President announces
18 Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, July 17, 1959.
14S.J. Res. i9 and 125; H.J. Res. 7, 3 35, 3 97, 2a3 and 5t9; and H.R. 513.
H.R. 51S (Multer) would deal with the problem by statute without a prior Con.
stitutional amendment upon the assumption that under the present Constitutional
provisions Congress has the power to legislate. For the reasons above stated, the
Committee does not recommend H.R. 513.
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his inability or (ii) if the Vice President is "satisfied" that the
President is disabled and convenes both Houses of Congress and
announces that the powers and duties have devolved upon him;
and (2) the President may resume his duties upon an announce-
ment of his ability and intention to so resume them. The Celler
proposal follows generally the provisions of the Eisenhower-
Nixon and Kennedy-Johnson agreements. It is open to the ob-
jections, discussed above, that it leaves the determination of
when Presidential inability commences solely to the President
and Vice President and the determination of when inability ends
solely to the President. The Committee does not recommend
H.J. Resolution 33.
H.J. Resolution 35 (Celler) is identical to H.J. Resolution 33,
except that H.J. Resolution 35 is in the form of a joint resolution
relating to Presidential inability affirming the substance of the
Kennedy-Johnson agreement, rather than a joint resolution pro.
posing a Constitutional amendment, as is H.J. Resolution 33.
While Congressional approval by a joint resolution of the pro-
visions of the Kennedy-Johnson agreement, which presently is
simply an understanding reached between the incumbent Presi-
dent and Vice President would seem to do no harm, the Commit-
tee nevertheless believes a clarifying Constitutional amendment
is necessary.
S.J. Resolution i 25 (Keating) proposes a Constitutional amend-
ment providing for the establishment of a "Presidential Inability
Commission" to determine the question of when inability begins
and ends. A similar proposal (H.J. Res. 97), except for the per-
sonnel of the commission, has been introduced by Congressman
Curtin. In view of the above stated "essentials of a Constitu-
tional amendment," the Committee does not recommend S.J.
Resolution 125 or H.J. Resolution 97.
There remain to be discussed H.J. Resolution 7 (Bennett),
identical to H.J. Resolution 223 (Robison), and S.J. Resolution
19 (Kefauver), identical in substance to H.J. Resolution 529
(Lindsay).
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H.J. Resolutions 7 and 223
Annexed hereto as Appendix 2 is H.J. Resolution 7 (identical
to H.J. Resolution 233). These Joint Resolutions propose a
Constitutional amendment in the form recommended by the
Committee on Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar
Association (Appendix i), which the Committee approves. 15
The Committee notes that H.J. Resolution 7 (Appendix 2) is
silent as to present Clause 5 of Section i of Article II of the Con-
stitution, but assumes that present Clause 5 would be repealed.
S.J. Resolution rg
Annexed hereto as Appendix 3 is S.J. Resolution 19 (which is
identical in substance to H.J. Resolution 529).
With immaterial exceptions, S.J. Resolution 19 is the same as
S.J. Resolution 4o, considered by this Committee in its 1959
Report. e
Because this Committee believes that the procedure for deter-
mining when inability commences and the system of restoration
should be left to Congress to determine," it does not recommend
S.J. Resolution 19 in its entirety as a desirable Constitutional
amendment, although it does recommend that certain of the
provisions contained in S.J. Resolution 19 should be embodied
in an amendment, as set forth in the Committee's recommenda.
tion (Appendix 4), and that certain other provisions contained
in S.J. Resolution 19 might be included in implementing legis-
lation after a Constitutional amendment has been adopted.
A detailed analysis of the six sections of S.J. Resolution 19
follows:
Section i deals with the case of the removal of the President
from office, or of his death or resignation. It provides that the
Vice President shall become President for the expiration of the
then current term. This confirms the practice which has, in fact,
15 Page 191 supra.
18 See note 13 supra.
T1 Page 191 supra.
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been the situation since Vice President Tyler in 1841 eliminated
the word "Acting" from the title "Acting President" on the first
paper submitted to him for signature after the death of William
Henry Harrison. Since then, six other men elected as Vice Presi-
dents of the United States: Messrs. Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur,
Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman, likewise assumed,
upon the death of the President in office, the actual office of the
Presidency and not just the powers and duties of the office.
Section 2 provides that the Vice President shall discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President as Acting President,
if the President himself declares in writing that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, but makes it clear
that only the powers and duties of the office shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President. In so far as this pro-
vision makes clear that only the powers and duties of the office
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President,
this Committee believes it should be included as part of a Con-
stitutional amendment. In so far as it deals with a determination
of inability by the President, a matter of procedure, this Com-
mittee believes it should be included in the implementing legis-
lation of Congress, and not frozen into the Constiffion.
Section 3 provides for the failure of the President to decl ire
his inability. The Vice President, if satisfied that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, shall,
upon the written approval of the majority of the heads of the
executive departments in office, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the office of President as Acting President.
Once again, it makes certain that the office of the Presidency does
not devolve upon the Vice President, but only the powers and
duties of the office. Furthermore, it vests in the Executive branch
of the Government, in the Vice President and the members of
the cabinet, presumably the men closest to the President and
upon whom he would rely to the greatest degree, the power to
determine and to confirm the President's inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President. Upon such deter-
mination and approval, the Vice President assumes the discharge
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of the powers and duties of the office of President as Acting Presi-
dent. This Committee believes that this section, which deals
with procedure, might also be included in implementing legis-
lation of Congress and should not be frozen into the Constitution.
Section 4 provides for the resumption of the powers and duties
of the office of the Presidency by the President when the Presi-
dent's inability is terminated. This the President may do by a
simple public announcement in writing that his inability has
terminated, and seven days thereafter he shall resume the dis-
charge of the powers and duties of his office. If there should be
a dispute as to the termination of the President's inability, the
Vice President, again with the written approval of a majority of
the heads of the executive departments in office at the time of the
President's announcement, may transmit to Congress the Vice
President's written declaration that in his opinion the President's
inability has not terminated. If this should occur, Congress shall
thereupon consider the issue and, if it is not in session, it shall
assemble in special session on the call of the Vice President. Upon
a concurrent resolution, adopted by Congress with the approval
of two-thirds of the members present in each House, to the effect
that the inability-ef-the-President-has-not-terminated,-the.4ce
President shall assume the discharge of the powers and duties of
the office of the President as Acting President until:
i. He proclaims the President's inability has ended;
2. Congress itself by concurrent resolution adopted by a ma.
jority of the members present in each House determines that the
President's inability has ended; or
3. The President's term ends.
In other words, a two-thirds vote of the members of each House
present is necessary to confirm the Vice President's declaration,
with the majority approval of the cabinet, that the President's
inability has not terminated. A simple majority of the vote of
the members present in each House to the effect that the Presi-
dent's inability has ended would thereafter restore the powers
and duties of the office of President to the President. Again, the
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President would retain the office of President and only the pow-
ers and duties of the office would devolve upon the Vice President
as Acting President.
It should be noted that Clause 3 of Section 7 of Article I of
the Constitution reads as follows:
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a Question
of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in
the Case of a Bill."
However, the view of the Senate Parliamentarian is that con.
current resolutions, at least in so far as the Senate is concerned,
are not used for legislative purposes and accordingly are not
required to be presented to the President. In Senate Procedure:
Precedents and Practices, by Charles L. Watkins and Floyd M.
Riddick, Government Printing Office, 1958, at pages 167-168,
there appears the following:
"Concurrent resolutions are not required to be presented to the President
of the United States unless they contain matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in character and effect [Footnote: Feb. so, 896, 54-1,
Journal, p. 145; Jan. *6, 1897, 54-1, Journal, p. 76; see Nov. 24, 1903, 58-1,
Record, p. 438.), and under the practice of the Senate they are not used for
legislative purposes, and are not sent to the President for approval. (Foot-
note: Nov. 7, 1919, 66-1, Record, pp. 8074-75.)"
This Committee assumes that under the procedure to be fol-
lowed the concurrent resolutions provided for in S.J. Resolution
19 would not require the approval or disapproval of the Presi-
dent, Vice President or Acting President, since the Congressional
action contemplated would seem to be more in the nature of fact
determination than "legislative in character and effect." If this
were not so, confusion could arise as to whether the Vice Presi-
dent as Acting President could disapprove the necessary concur-
rent resolutions adopted by Congress in his capacity as Acting
President. This could result in a situation where a two-thirds
vote of the Senate and House of Representatives would be neces-
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sary under all circumstances to restore the powers and duties of
the office of President to the President from the Vice President
serving as Acting President,-a result that is not contemplated
and is directly contrary to the intent of S.J. Resolution 19.
As with respect to Section 3, Secton 4 which deals with pro.
cedure might be included in implementing legislation of Con.
gress and should not be frozen into the Constitution.
The first sentence of Section 5 provides, in the language of the
present clause of the Constitution, that Congress may provide
for the case of the removal by death, resignation or inability both
of the President and the Vice President, "declaring what officer
shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly
until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
Upon consideration, the Committee favors a change in the lan-
guage of the present clause of the Constitution, as proposed by
the Committee on Federal Constitution of the New York State
Bar Association (Appendix i), the effect of which would be that
upon the removal, death or resignation of both the President and
the Vice President the officer next in line of succession would
succeed to the office, and not merely the powers and duties of the
office, but that in the case of inability such official would only be
Acting President. Such change is reflected also in the Committee's
proposed Constitutional amendment (Appendix 4, Sec. 4). If
both the President and Vice President have died, resigned the
office, or been removed from office, there seems to the Committee
no reason why the person next in line of succession should not
become President, and not Acting President. Under circum-
stances where there is no likelihood that the President or Vice
President will again be available to fill the office of President,
the country's interests would be better served, especially in the
field of foreign relations, by a "full-fledged" President rather
than by an Acting President. The Committee is aware that such
change in the Constitution would require conforming changes
in the Presidential Succession Act,18 which spells out who shall
18 3 US. Code Annotated, §tg (June 25, 1958, C. 644, §1.625 Stat. 672).
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exercise the powers and duties of the office of President, and pro.
vides that such person shall "act as President," whether his prede-
cessor in the office of President (either the President or Vice
President) has died, was removed, resigned or was merely
disabled.
The second sentence of Section 5 provides for the situation
where there is no Vice President. Under such circumstances, the
powers and duties conferred by the amendment on the Vice
President "shall devolve upon the officer eligible to act as Presi-
dent next in line of succession to the office of President, as
provided by law." The Committee believes that this situation
should be dealt with by implementing legislation and not by
amendment.
Section 6 provides that the proposed amendment shall be
inoperative unless ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of
the States within seven years from the date of its submission.
Section 6 should obviously be a part of the Constitutional amend-
ment.
The Committee notes that S.J. Resolution g1 (Appendix 3)
is silent as to present Clause 5 of Section i of Article II of the
Constitution, but assumes that present Clause 5 would be re-
pealed.
THE NEED FOR ACTION
In examining the literature concerning the question of Presi-
dential inability, the Committee was impressed by the fact that
the literature ebbs and flows with the status of the health of the
incumbent in the White House. Thus in 1881, at the time when
President Garfield lay critically stricken, a number of articles
dealing with the Presidential inability question and prospective
solutions appeared. In 1919 and 192o, during the illness of Presi-
dent Wilson, once again the question came to the forefront of
the minds of tie American people. Most recently, during the ill-
nesses of President Eisenhower, the subject was revived and num.
erous proposals advanced, extensive hearings conducted by both
Houses of Congress, and articles written.
20-328 0 - 63 - 6
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The Republic cannot afford, in the present age of global and
national problems of great complexity and vital importance, to
allow the Constitutional problem of possible Presidential in-
ability to remain in its present unsatisfactory state. It would seem
that the present is the time for objective analysis and appraisal
of the situation and for setting in motion the necessary machinery
for the enactment of a Constitutional amendment, to be followed
by implementing legislation resolving the question permanently
and unambiguously.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Committee recommends the adoption of an amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution dealing with the problem of
Presidential inability, that would:
(i) confirm the established view that upon the removal
of the President from office, or of his death or resignation,
the Vice President actually becomes President;
(ii) reaffirm and clarify beyond any doubt that in case
of the inability of the President to discharge the powers
- and duties of the office of President, the Vice President
assumes only the powers and duties of the office, and not
the office itself; and
(iii) empower Congress to enact legislation for deter-
mining when inability commences and when it terminates.
2. With respect to specific proposals, the Committee recom-
mends the adoption of an amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion either (i) in the form of Appendix 4 to this Report; or (ii)
in the form recommended by the Committee on Federal Con-
19 Four members of the Committee disagree with the recommendation in favor
of the last sentence of Section 3 of the proposed Constitutional amendment
(Appendix 4), which reads: "The commencement and termination of any inability
shall be determined by such method as the Congress shall by law provide." These
members are Inclined to the view that such power, if specifically granted by the
Constitution at all, should rest primarily in the Executive branch of the Govern-
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stitution of the New York State Bar Association (Appendix i)
which is embodied in H.J. Resolution 7 and s23 (Appendix 2)."
Respectfully submitted,
THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
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ment, and therefore would favor something along the lines of the Kefauver and
Lindsay Joint Resolutions (Appendix 3), which assigns to the Executive branch In
the first instance the responsibility of dealing with the question of Presidential
inability in preference to assigning such responsibility to Congress. Three members
would (i) approve an amendment which contained only Section a and the first sen.
tence of Section 3 of Appendix 4 (i.e. confirming the established view that upon the
removal of the President from office, or his death or resignation, the Vice President
actually becomes President, and reaffirming and clarifying beyond any doubt that
in the case of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of
the office of President, the Vice President assumes only the powers and duties
of the office, and not the office itself) and (a) leave to the President and Vice Presil
dent at the time in office the more detailed resolution of the problem within the
framework of the clarified Constitutional language. Mr. Calderon does not believe
that there is sufficient warrant to amend the existing Constitutional provision.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
RESOLUTIONS PROPOSED FOR STATED MEETING
OF THE ASSOCIATION
RESOLVED, that this Association favors the adoption of an
amendment to the Federal Constitution dealing with the prob-
lem of Presidential inability, that would:
(i) confirm the established view that upon the removal
of the President from office, or of his death or resignation,
the Vice President actually becomes President;
(ii) reaffirm and clarify beyond any doubt that in case
of the inability of the President to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of President, the Vice President
assumes only the powers and duties of the office, and not
the office itself; and
(iii) empower Congress to enact legislation for deter-
miningwhen inability commences and when it terminates.
RESOLVED, that this Association recommends the adoption of
an amendment to the Federal Constitution either in the form of
Appendix 4 to the Report of the Committee on Federal Legis-
lation dated March 2o, 196, or in the form of Appendix i to
said Report, which is embodied in H.J. Resolutions 7 and 223
(Appendix 2).
RESOLVED, that the Report of this Association's Committee on
Federal Legislation dated March 2o, 1962, on S.J. Resolutions
19 and 125, H.J. Resolutions 7, 3S, 97, 223 and 529, 87th Con-
gress, relating to proposed amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion dealing with the problem of Presidential inability, and other
proposals, is approved.
APPENDIX 1
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death
or Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on the Vice President.
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In Case of the Inability of the President to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the said Powers and Duties shall devolve on
the Vice President, until the Inability be removed. The Congress may
by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or In-
ability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Offi-
cer shall then be President, or in case of Inability, act as President,
and such Officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a Presi-
dent shall be elected or, in case of Inability, until the Inability shall
be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of any
Inability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by
law provide.
APPENDIX 2
H.J. RESOLUTION 7 (Bennett) 87th Congress
(Identical to H.J. Resolution 223 (Robison) Syth Congress)
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to Presidential inability
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION i. In case of the removal of the President from office, or
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the Vice
President. In case of the inability of the President to discharge the
powers and duties of the said office the said powers and duties shall
devolve on the Vice President, until the inability be removed. The
Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resigna-
tion or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what officer shall then be President, or in case of inability, act as
President, and such officer shall be or act as President accordingly,
until a President shall be elected or, in case of inability, until the
inability shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termina-
tion of any inability shall be determined by such method as Congress
shall by law provide.
"SECTION 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
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been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission to the States by the Congress."
APPENDIX 3
S.J. RESOLUTION 19 (Kefauver) 87th Congress
(Identical in substance to H.J. Resolution 529 (Lindsay) 87th Congress)
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating
to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION i. In case of the removal of the President from office, or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President
for the unexpired portion of the then current term.
"SECTION 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
"SECTION 8. If the President does not so declare, the Vice President,
if satisfied that such inability exists, shall, upon the written approval
of a majority of the heads of the executive departments in office,
assume the discharge of the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
"SECTION 4. Whenever the President makes public announcement
in writing that his inability has terminated, he shall resume the dis-
charge of the powers and duties of his office on the seventh day after
making such announcement. But if the Vice President, with the writ-
ten approval of a majority of the heads of executive departments in
office at the time of such announcement, transmits to the Congress
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his written declaration that in his opinion the President's inability
has not terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the issue.
If the Congress is not then in session, it shall assemble in special
session on the call of the Vice President. If the Congress determines
by concurrent resolution, adopted with the approval of two-thirds of
the Members present in each House, that the inability of the Presi-
dent has not terminated, thereupon, notwithstanding any further
announcement by the President, the Vice President shall assume the
discharge of such powers and duties as Acting President until the
occurrence of the earliest of the following events: (i) the Acting Presi-
dent proclaims that the President's inability has ended, (a) the Con.
gress determines by concurrent resolution, adopted with the approval
of a majority of the Members present in each House, that the Presi-
dent's inability has ended, or (3) the President's term ends.
"SECTION 5. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the
removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and
such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed, or
a President shall be elected. If at any time there is no Vice President,
the powers and duties conferred by this article upon the Vice Presi-
dent shall devolve upon the officer eligible to act as President next
in line of succession to the office of President, as provided by law.
"SECTIoN 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission."
APPENDIX 4
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO CARRY OUT
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating
to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
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amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION I. Clause 5 of Section i of Article II of the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
"SECTION 2. In case of the removal of the President from office, or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President
for the unexpired portion of the then current term.
"SECTION 3. In case of the inability of the President to discharge
the powers and duties of his said office the said powers and duties
shall devolve on the Vice President until the inability be removed.
The commencement and termination of any inability shall be deter-
mined by such method as the Congress shall by law provide.
"SECTION 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the
removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then be President, or, in
case of inability, act as President, and sucl officer shall be or act
accordingly until the disability be removed or a President shall be
elected.
"SECTION 5. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission."
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ExmBrr No. 2
THE W1IrrT HOUSE,
OFFICE OF THE Wirr HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY,
August 10, 1961.
The President and the Vice President have agreed to adhere to
procedures identical to those which former President Eisenhower
and Vice President Nixon adopted with regard to any questions
of presidential inability. Those procedures are as follows:
(1) In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would
serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of
the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appro-
priate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.(3) The President, in either event, would determine when
the inability had ended and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
After consultation with the Attorney General, it is the under-
standing of the President and the Vice President that these pro-
cedures reflect the correct interpretation to be given to article II,
section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution. This was also the view of the
prior administration and is supported by the great majority of con-
stitutional scholars.
The relevant constitutional provision is:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Reslg-
nation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected.
Under this provision, upon a proper determination of presidential
inability the Vice President succeeds temporarily to the powers and
duties of the Presidency until such time as the President is enabled
to act again. Unlike the case of removal death, or resignation, the
Vice President does not permanently come President.
Under the arrangement quoted above, the Vice President agrees
to serve as Acting President "after such consultation as seems tohim appropriate under the circumstances." There is no provision
of the Constitution or of law prescribing any procedure of consulta-
tion, but the President and Vice President felt t as a matter of wis-dom and sound judgment, that the Vice President would wish to
have the support of the Cabinet as to the necessity and desirability
of discharging the powers and duties of the Presidency as Acting
President as well as legal advice from the Attorney General that
the circumstances would, under the Constitution, justify his doing
so. Thle understanding between the President and the Vice President
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authorizes the Vice President to consult with these officials with a
a free mind that this is what the President intended in the event of
a crisis.
Prior to the Eisenhower-Nixon arrangement, there were no sim-
ilar understandings of a public nature. For this reason, prior Vice
Presidents have hesitated to take any initiative during the period
when the President was disabled. Obviously, this is a risk which
cannot be taken in these times, and it is for that reason that Presi-
dent Kennedy and Vice President Johnson have agreed to follow
the precedent established by the past administration.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
EXHIBIT No. 3
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution authorizes the Vice
President to act as President in the event of the President's In.
ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and to act
In that capacity "until the disability be removed."
The same Article is interpreted as vesting authority in the Vice Presi-
dent to decide whether Presidential Inability exists, if the Presi-
dent Is unable to do so, and authorizes the President to determine
when his Inability has ended.
The memorandum of March 8, 1958, between former President Dwight
D. Elsenhower and former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, rep.
resenting their understanding of the constitutional role of the Vice
President as acting President in the event of Presidential Inability,
is consistent with the correct interpretation of Article II, section 1,
clause 6 of the Constitution.
Attorneys General Herbert Brownell, r. and William P. Rogers have
expressed the same views on the Identical questions.
AUGUST 2, 1961.
TmB PESIDzNT.
Dzan Mn. PRESnINT: I have the honor to respond to your
request for my opinion upon the construction to be given
to the Presidential inability clause of the Constitution.
Article II, section 1, clause 6 reads as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected."
You request my opinion on these questions: first, whether
when Presidential inability occurs, the Vice President under
Vol. 42 Op. No. 5.
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Article II, section 1, clause 6 succeeds to the "Powers and
Duties" of the Presidency or whether he succeeds to the "Of-
fice," i.e., becomes President and remains in the office even
if the inability should cease; second, who determines whether
the inability exists and who determines whether the inability
has ended; and third, whether the memorandum of March 3,
1958, between former President Eisenhower and former Vice
President Nixon, representing their understanding of the con-
stitutional role of the Vice President as acting President,
is a desirable precedent for this Administration to follow.
As shall be shown hereafter, the great majority of scholars
and my two immediate predecessors have expressed the
opinion that upon a determination of Presidential inability
the Vice President succeeds temporarily to the powers and
duties of that office, and does not permanently become Presi-
dent; and it is also their opinion that the Vice President
may determine whether the inability exists. My immediate
predecessors were also of the opinion that the President may
determine when his inability has ended, and thereupon resume
the discharge of the Presidential functions. For reasons to
be discussed hereafter, I concur in their opinions. I also
conclude that the understanding of March 3, 1958, is in keep-
ing with the Constitution, and that the precedent set by it
could appropriately be followed by this Administration.
I
It case of Presidential inability does the office itself or do
merely the powers and duties of the office devolve on the
Vice President?
For many years constitutional scholars have debated
whether Article II, section 1, clause 6 was intended to trans-
form a Vice President into a President upon the occurrence
of the latter's inability. It will be noted that this clause
contemplates four situations in which the Vice President
may be called upon to act as President. In three situations,
permanent exclusion of the President from the remainder of
his term is obvious since these involved removal from office,
death or resignation. The difference of opinion arises re-
specting the fourth contingency, vis: "Inability to discharge
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the Powers and Duties of the said Office." Did the authors
of the Constitution intend to exclude the President thereafter,
despite his complete recovery, from resuming the discharge
of his powers and duties? It may be noted that after this
fourth contingency follow the words "the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President." Do the words "the Same" refer to
the office of President, or do they refer to "the Powers and
Duties"?
It is my opinion that under Article II, section 1, clause 6
of the Constitution the Vice President merely discharges the
powers and duties of the Presidency during the President's
inability and this conclusion, as shall be shown hereafter,
finds support in the following:
1. The records and history of the Constitutional Con-
vention.
2. Debates in the Convention and ratifying conventions.
3. Consideration of other provisions in the Constitution.
4. The example and experience of the States in providing
for succession.
5. The dictates of reason and established rules of statutory
construction.
6. The great weight of constitutional authority.
These considerations will be discussed in order.
1. The records and history of the Constitutional Con-
vention.
Without dispute, Article II, section 1, clause nowhere
expressly provides that the Vice President shall under any
circumstances become President. Had the framers of the
Constitution intended the Vice President in certain con-
tingencies to become President, they would not have been
at a loss for words. Reference to the records of the Con-
stitutional Convention discloses that the framers of the
Constitution never intended the Vice President in event of
Presidential inability to be anything but an acting President
while the inability continued.
Of the various written plans submitted for consideration
at the Convention, only Charles Pinckney's draft offered
May 29, 1787, specifically referred to Presidential disability.
Article VIII of this draft provided in part that in case of the
President's removal through impeachment, death, resignation
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or disability "the President of the Senate shall exercise the
duties of his office until another President be chosen * * *."
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole
to consider various proposals, but having made little progress
on the question of the President's inability, referred this
proposal to the Committee of Detail which was then con-
sidering other matters. This Committee reported a draft
on August 6, 1787, which contained Article X, section 2
relating to Presidential inability. It provided that ir 'ase
of the President's removal as aforesaid through impeaclu ant,
death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, "the President of the Senate shall exercise
those powers and duties, until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be
removed."' On August 27, Mr. Dickinson remarked about
the vagueness of this clause. "What," he said, "is the extent
of the term 'disability' & who is to be the judge of itf" Un-
fortunately, his suggestion produced no clarification.'
It will be noted that up to this point the official to act as
President until the President's disability was ended was
"the President of the Senate," not the Vice President.
Article X of the draft was then referred to the Committee
of Eleven which reported on September 4. In its report
provision was included for the first time for a Vice President,
as distinguished from the President of the Senate' who
was to be e9 oOoio, President of the Senate, except on two
occasions: when the Senate sat in impeachment of the Presi-
dent, in which case the Chief Justice would preside, and
"when he shall exercise the powers and duties of the Presi-
dent," in which case of his absence, the Senate would choose
a President pro tempore. The Committee of Eleven also
recommended that the latter part of section 2 of Article X
be amended to provide that in case of the President's removal
on impeachment, death, absence, resignation or inability to
discharge the powers or duties of his office "the Vice Presi-
dent shall exercise those powers and duties until another
S8 Max Farraud, rFA Roord of th Federdol onafftos oif 78 (1911 Nd.),
600.
*t id. 186.
*2 d. 421.
S2 id. 496.
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President be chosen, or until the inability of the President
be removed."' He was not to become the President in
either event.
On September 7, the Convention adopted an amendment
to cover the vacancy or disability of both the President and
Vice President providing that the Legislature may declare
by law what officer of the United States shall act as President
in such event, and "such Officer shall act accordingly, until
such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." *
On September 8, the last clause of section 2, Article X
was agreed to by the Convention, and a Committee of five
was appointed "to revise the style and arrange the articles
agreed to by the House" including those provisions dealing
with inability.' Thus, as the proposed article came to the
Committee on Style, it consisted of two clauses dealing with
Presidential succession. The first related to the devolution
of the powers and duties of the President's office on the Vice
President in certain cases including the President's inability.
The second authorized Congress to designate an officer to act
as President in cases in which both the President and Vice
President were disabled, had died, resigned or been removed.
A temporal clause modified each main clause limiting the
tenure of an acting President to the duration of the inability
or until "another President be chosen" (first clause) or
until "a President shall be elected" (second clause). Noth-
ing in either clause said that the Vice President was to
become President.
On September 12 the Committee on Style, condensing and
combining the provision for Presidential inability, together
with the provision for joint inability of both the President
and Vice President, reported the clause as follows:
"(e) In case of the removal of the president from of-
fice, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall de-
volve on the vice-president, and the Congress may by law
provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or in-
ability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring
*2 Id. 495, 499.
*8 M. 689.
SDav ts IlabUffy o; the Prsdent, Sen. Doo. No. 808, 65th Cont., 8d Me&
10 (1918).
* 2 Frrand, op. o. f. pr note 1, 598-99.
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what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall
act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the pe-
riod for chusing another president arrive."
Madison crossed out the words "the period for chusing an-
other president arrive" and inserted in their place "a Presi-
dent shall be elected."' In this form the clause was writ-
ten into the finAl draft of the Constitution.
The Committee on Style had no authority to amend or
alter the substance or meaning of the provisions, but merely
to combine and integrate them as a matter of form.10 In
this setting, the effect of what was done by it may be better
understood by placing the provisions originally agreed to
by the Convention side by side with the clauses as they were
adopted by the Convention.
"Articles Originally Agreed As Later Reported by Con-.
to by the Convention mittee on Style and Finally
Article X, section 2: * * *
and in case of removal as
aforesaid, death, absence,
resignation or inability to
discharge the powers or du-
ties of his office, the Vice
President shall exercise those
powers and duties until an-
other President be chosen, or
until the inability of the
President be removed.
Article X, section 1: The
Legislature may declare by
law what officer of the United
States shall act as President,
in case of the death, resigna-
tion, or disability of the
President and Vice Presi-
dent;
* 2 fd. 628. See also 2 id. 599.
* Davia, op. oil. #vpro note 7, 11.
Adopted
Article II, section 1, para-
graph 6: In case of the re-
moval of the President from
office, or of his death, resig-
nation, or inability to dis.
charge the powers and duties
of the said office, the same
shall devolve on the Vice
President;
and the Congress may by law
provide for the caoo of re-
moval, death, resignation or
inability, both of the Presi-
dent and Vice President, de-
claring what officer shall
then act as President;
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and such Officer shall act ac- ' and such officer shall act ac-
cordingly, until such dis- cordingly, until the disability
ability be removed, or a Pres- be removed, or a President
ident shall be elected, shall be elected."
Comparison of these provisions makes clear the inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution. When the provi-
sions were placed into the hands of the Committee on Style
and Arrangement, they explicitly provided that in case of
inability of the President, the Vice President was not to
become President, but merely to "exercise those powers and
duties * * * until the inability of the President be re-
moved." When, therefore, the Committee on Style con-
densed the language and reported the provision to read in
case of the President's "inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President," the exact meaning intended by the Con-
vention was carried over to the revised language.
It has been argued by one school of thought that "the
Same" as used in the succession clause refers to "Office," and
therefore the office devolves on the Vice President who there-
by becomes President. The other school asserts that "the
Same" has reference to "Powers and Duties," and that the
Vice President may merely discharge those powers and
duties, but does not become President. Since a definitive
answer is not to be found in any fixed rules of English usage,
Professor Ruth C. Silva has concluded that the antecedent
of "the Same" should be ascertained on the basis of the
intention of those who framed and ratified the Convention."
This is sound construction.
This interpretation is reinforced by other language ini-
tially agreed to by the Convention. If it were intended that
the Vice President should act permanently as President, it
seems unlikely that the language adopted by the Convention
and sent to the Committee on Style would expressly prescribe
a temporary period during which the Vice President shall
exercise "those powers and duties," vis: "until another Presi-
dent be chosen, or until the inability of the President be
removed."
u SUlva PreeWtd.lal uotseion 82 (1951).
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When we refer to the provisions before and after the
Committee on Style had combined them, it appears that the
Committee did several things: consolidated the two pro.
visions into one and introduced the words "the same shall
devolve on the Vice President"; omitted reference to
"absence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule;
used the adverbial clause "until the disability be removed,"
only once instead of using it to modify each of the preceding
clauses separately; substituted "inability" for "disability" in
the clause referring to succession beyond the Vice President,
possibly as being more comprehensive and covering both
absence and temporary physical disability; and changed the
semicolon after "Vice President" to a comma so that the
limiting clause beginning "and such Officer" would refer both
to the Vice President and the officer designated by Congress.
Thus the evolution of this clause makes clear that merely the
powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, not the
office itself.
2. The debates in the Convention and in the ratifying
conventions.
The debates in the Convention are not too illuminating on
the question whether a Vice President was merely to act as
President until the latter's disability was over or to become
President. In support of the view that the debates demon-
strate recognition that the Vice President's role was to be a
temporary one while the inability existed, statements relied
on are not squarely in point, but the inferences drawn are
entitled to weight.
Thus, Professor Silva states:" "* * * This assumption
[that the Vice President is an acting President] is implicit
in James Wilson's objections to the election of the President
by Congress. The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that
the Senate might prevent the filling of a vacancy by dilatory
action, so that their own presiding officer could continue to
exercise the executive function. Gouverneur Morris and
James Madison likewise objected to this mode of election for
a similar reason-the Senate might retard appointment of a
President in order that its own presiding officer might con-
tinue to possess veto power. Such objections are without
u d. 10.
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merit if the President's successor was intended to become
President for the remainder of the term."
There is other evidence from which the intention of the
delegates may be determined. Charles Warren reports that
during the debates little enthusiasm was expressed for an
officer such as the Vice President, that the discussion centered
on his status as a legislative officer, and there was no discus-
sion as to his succession even in case of the President's
death." However, Warren is of the opinion "the deolgates
probably contemplated that * * * the Vice President would
only perform the duties of President until a now election for
President should be hold; and that he would not ipso facto
become President."" It seems fairly clear that it the dole-
gates did not contemplate that the Vice President shall be-
come President on the death of the President, but only
perform the duties of the office, that they certainly did not
intend any different result upon tile President's inability.
Discussion of the succession clause at teo ratifying con-
ventions was also singularly unenlightening.
Professor Silva, who has made a careful study of tihe
matter, reports there is no record of discussion of the succes-
sion clause at the ratifying conventions except briefly at. tite
Virginia Convention. George Mason objected to the clause
because it lacked provision for the prompt election of another
President in event of vacancy in both the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential offices. Madison's attempt to answer this
objection indicated that ho did not think that the designated
officer in event of succession beyond the Vice President
"would have that tenure which the Constitution guarantees
to a de jure President," but it does not appear that Madison
had in mind the status of a Vice President who might. be
acting as President." What is of greater signillcanco is that
thle delegates in the ratifying conventions always carefully
distinguished between "the President" and "the acting Presi-
dent." Refernce was made to "the Vice President, when
acting as President," not "the Vice Priidont when he bo-
I Charles Warren, The Makng of the Oonetlufon, 684-035 (1028).
Si(d. 835.
** Bliva, op. off. supra not# 11, 11.
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comes President."" Silva says that "nowhere in the do.
bates of the ratifying conventions did a single one of the
delegates use the latter expression.""
The Federalist, in which Hamilton defended the proposed
Constitution and( explained in detail its provisions, is sur-
prisingly silent as a whole on what was intended when a
President suffers inability. However, at one point Hamilton
defended the role of a Vice President over the objection that
his position would be "superfluous, if not mischievous." He
urged that two considerations justified the Vice President's
position: one to cast the deciding vote in the Senate when
they were equally divided; the other, that "the vice-president
may occasionally become a substitute for the president * * *,
and exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the
president." "
While these debates in the Convention and ratifying con-
ventions appear to be inconclusive, generally they tend, to
support the argument that a Vice President or designated
officer was never, in the view of the framers of the Constitu-
tion, intended to become President. If there was Presidential
inability, the Vice President was to act only until the inability
was terminated. 19
3. Consideration of other provisions of the Conatitution.
Reference to other provisions of the Constitution also
supports the conclusion that in event of Presidential inability,
the Vice President would merely serve as acting President.
For example, the Twelfth Amendment provides that if
the House should not choose a President before March 4,
"then the Vice-President shall act as President as in the case
of the death or other constitutional disability of the Presi-
dent." (Italicsadded.) It may be observed that this Amend-
ment does not say that the Vice President will become Presi-
dent in this situation. From the underscored language,
Warren has concluded that when the Twelfth Amendment
was adopted, "its framers interpreted the Constitution as
meaning that the Vice President should only act as President
**fd. 12.
TAhro Federltt (J. W. Cooke, ed., 1961), No. 08, pp. 461-462.
oSllva op. oft. supra note I, 1,7.
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in case of the latter's death * * *.' " And from this it
would necessarily follow that he would not become President
in case of the President's inability.
Other provisions of the Constitution also consistently avoid
language to the effect that the Vice President shall become
President except in a single instance where this was the
specific intention. Thus, Article I, section 3, clause 5 states
that the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore, in the
absence of the Vice President or "when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States." Here again, the
action of the Vice President is not described "as becoming
President," but merely that he shall "exercise the Office."
On the other hand in section 8 of the Twentieth Amendment,
where it was intended that the Vice President shall actually
become President, it is explicitly provided that if, at the
time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the
President elect has died, the Vice President-elect "shall
become President." The same section provides, moreover,
by way of comparison that in event the President has not
been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his
term, or if the President elect fails to qualify then the Vice
President elect "shall act as President" until a President has
qualified, and similar language is employed where neither
a President elect nor a Vice President-elect shall have
qualified.
This difference' in treatment in various provisions of the
Constitution taken as a whole convinces me that both the
framers of the Constitution and members of the Congress
engaged in drafting amendments to the Constitution have
been in agreement that a Vice President "becomes President"
only when precise language to that effect is used, and that
it is not to be implied.
4. The example and experience of the States as a guide.
In attempting to ascertain the intention of the framers
of the Constitution, it is helpful to know what the practice
was in the Thirteen States when the Constitution was
adopted. We would expect that the provisions of those
State Constitutions dealing with succession in event of a
"Charles Warren, op. off. supro note 13, 687. As is shown hereinafter,
however, "constitutional custom" has undoubtedly modified this original fIn
terpretation In the event of the President's death.
20-326 0 63 - 8
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Governor's inability definitely influenced and shaped the
thinking of the framers of the Constitution in determining
what provision should be made in event of Presidential
inability. Accordingly we may consider those State con-
stitutional provisions as a guide in interpreting the corre-
sponding succession clause in the Constitution of the United
States.
In most of the States at that time, in event of the Gov-
ernor's "absence" from the State or during his inability,
provision was made for the temporary exercise of the Gov-
ernor's powers by the succeeding officer. The Governor was
not ousted; he remained the Governor in those contingencies,
resuming the discharge of his functions upon his recovery."
So too, today, with very few exceptions, State Constitutions
expressly or impliedly provide that where the Governor is
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office, the
officer next in line of succession shall discharge them, but
only temporarily."
The inferences to be drawn from this review of State
practice and experience relating to gubernatorial disability
and its bearing upon the problem of Presidential inability
have been summarized forcefully by Professor Joseph E.
Kallenbach: 1
"* * * State experience reinforces the point observable
in national experience that situations of various kinds can
and do arise involving inability of the Chief Executive to
exercise his powers and which require devolution of these
powers for an indefinite period of time upon the officer next
in line of succession. It shows that constitutional provisions
on this point are, in effect, self-executing. It shows that
devolution of power in these circumstances can be brought
about by simple acquiescence of the incumbent when he is
able to recognize his incapacity. He does not, by so doing,
remove himself from office, but merely acquiesces in the
nRichard H. Hansen, Brecutlve DisabtU(ty, 40 Nebr. L. Rev. 697, 701-708
(1961).
* Kallenbach says that currently 46 States have such provisions. Pre0-
dential Inability, House Committee Print, 84th Cong., 2d seas. 40 (Jan. 81,
1956). See also, Richard H. Hansen, The Year We HRd No President (to be
published soon). A fairly complete survey of provisions of State laws re-
lating to disability of the Chief Executive of the States also appears nl
Presidential Inablifty, House Committee Print, ibid. 68 sef aq.
S ibid. 43.
1 0"
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operation of the constitutional rule that permits and requires
the succeeding officer to exercise the powers of the chief
executiveship. The officer named by the constitution or
laws as the one upon whom the authority to act as governor
shall devolve has no option but to exercise the powers and
duties of that office, even though his doing so does not oust
the incumbent from the office of governor permanently. His
duty to so act is an ancillary and conditional function of
the incumbent in the office next in line in the succession.
When and if the cause occasioning the temporary devolution
of power has ceased to be operative, there must be a resump-
tion of his constitutional powers and duties by the tempo-
rarily displaced Chief Executive. His assertion of his right
and capacity to reassume the powers and duties of his office
is ordinarly regarded as sufficient to restore them to him."
5. The dioates of redon and established rules of statu-
tory construction.
As between two different interpretations to be given a
constitutional provision, it is fundamental that one will be
adopted which avoids inconsistencies and results which are
harsh or absurd.
Inherent in the position that a succeeding Vice President
becomes President upon the latter's inability, is the fact that
the President must forfeit his office, if through no fault of
his own he suffers inability, however temporary it may be.
It is difficult to draw any such conclusion from the lan-
guage of the Constitution, or to imply one which carries with
it such grievous and drastic consequences, particularly where
the Constitution expressly declares only one way to remove
the President, and that is through impeachment.
The absurdity of such an interpretation is made even more
apparent when considered with the language of Article II,
section 1, clause 6 authorizing the Congress, in case of dis-
ability of both the President and Vice President to deter-
mine "what officer shall then act as President." It is claimed
by those who assert that the Vice President becomes Presi-
dent in event of Presidential inability, that the limiting
clause "until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected," refers only to the clause immediately preceding
it, under which an officer designated by law acts as Presi-
dent when both the President and Vice President are dis-
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abled, and that it has no reference to the first portion of the
clause where the President alone suffers inability. It is
therefore argued that the Vice President under the latter
contingency takes office for the remainder of the term free
of any limitation."
This contention, if accepted, would create an inconsistency
and disparity in treatment between the President and Vice
President most difficult to explain on rational grounds. We
would then have the anomalous result that the Constitution
discriminates against the President who has been elected and
favors one not elected to that office. Such a dubious con-
struction may not be adopted.
As was said in the 1881 debate on the subject:" "What
principle, what consideration of expediency or policy is it
which forbids the President, when relieved of his 'inability,'
from reassuming the office to which he was elected, which
does not apply with at least as much force to the Vice-
President who was not elected to itt I can imagine none."
There is another apparent weakness in this argument.
Assume that both the President and the Vice President were
disabled. Under the clause providing for joint disability,
if the President recovered before the Vice President, he
could resume the responsibilities of his office. It obviously
makes little sense to say that under the first clause where
the President alone is disabled that he forfeits his office
permanently, but that under the second clause where both
he and the Vice President are disabled simultaneously, the
President would not forfeit his office if he recovers first."
The framers of the Constitution were wise and mature men.
Absurd and illogical results, repelled by reason, have no
place in the Constitution. Nor should an interpretation in-
volving an anomaly be imported into the Constitution unless
the language itself compels it; here, "there is no such
compulsion." "
SSenator Cbarles W. Jones, 18 Cong. Rec. 142-143, 101-193 (1881).
XSenator Richard Coke, 13 Cong. Rec. 141 (1881). See also, William W.
Croaskey, Hearings before Special Subcommittee of House Committee on the
Judiciary to Study Presidential Inability, 84th Cong., 2d sess. 107 (1950).
" Crosskey, (d. 107.
nid.
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6. The great weight of constitutional authority.
In the face of these arguments, it is not surprising that
almost every student of the Constitution who was recently
canvassed to express an opinion, agreed that in case of tem-
porary Presidential inability, the Vice President succeeds
only to the powers and duties of the office as the acting
President, and not to the office itself; " and in event of a
seemingly permanent disability, the large majority of these
scholars concluded the result would be the same because it is
always possible that the disability may be removed." Both
of my immediate predecessors, former Attorneys General
Herbert Brownell o and William P. Rogers " concurred in
the majority view. This view, in my opinion, is clearly
right.
As against the arguments supporting this array of opinion,
there are arguments on the other side expounded by rela-
tively few scholars.
A major contention already noted is that the immediate
antecedent of the words "the Same" in Article II, section 1,
clause 6 of the Constitution is "said Office," and, therefore,
a reasonable interpretation is that it is the Presidential office,
M Included in this group of distinguished scholars of the Constitution were:
Stephen K. Dalley, Princeton Univeraity; Ererett S. Brown, University of
Michigan; Edward 8. Corwio, Princeton, N.J.; William W. Crosskey, Uni-
rersity of Chicago Law School: Charles FaIrman, Law School of Harvard
University; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin; Thomas K. Finletter,
Esq., New York, N.Y.; James Hart, University of Virginia; Arthur N. Hot-
combe, Harvard University; Mark DeW. Howe, Law School of Harvard Unt-
versity; Richard 0. Huber, Tulane University; Joseph D. Kallenbacb, Unit
versity of Michigan; Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois; J. Roland
Pennock, Swarthmore College; 0. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago;
John II. nomant, the Brooklngs Institution, and Arthur 1. Sutherland,
Law School of Harvard University. Presidential InabilltU, House Committee
Print, 85th Cong., 1st sess. 49-52 (1057).
SId. 52-54.
SHerbert Brownell, Jr., Preildential Inability: The Need for a Oonstitu.
lional Amendment, 08 Yale L.J. 180, 102-193, 203-205 (1958); Hearing
before the Special Subcommittee of the House Oommittee on the Judfcfary
on Problem of Preedential Inability, 85th Cong., Ist seas., 4, 10 (1057).
SPresdemtial Inability, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oonetttu.
tional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committe, 147, 148-140 (1958).
On the other hand, former Attorney General Wayne MacVcagh would prob.
ably have supported the minority view. During Oarfeld's Illness, MacVeagb,
although agreed on the desirability of having Vice President Arthur act as
President, felt that "Arthur's exercise of presidential power would be equiva.
lent to Oariteld's abdication." Silva, Presedential Succession, op. cit. supro
note 11, 50. Unfortunately, we are not favored by any exposition on the
subject by MacVeagh.
:...
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not merely the President's powers and duties, which devolve
upon the Vice President."
Arguments to the contrary resting on established principles
of statutory construction have been made in detail above and
need not be repeated. Suffice it to say, Article II does not
provide that the Vice President shall become President upon
the latter's inability. Since it is a contradiction in terms to
have at one moment two Presidente-the one disabled, the
other in office-and for the other reasons mentioned, the con-
tention that "the Same" means "said Office" must be rejected
as lacking in merit,
Another argument made in support of the theory that it
is the office of President which devolves, is that the Constitu-
tion vests executive power in the President, knows a single
Executive, and by implication bars any one from exercising
it other than one actually President. It is claimed that in
recognition of this principle, the courts have denied any one
the right to discharge powers and duties of the President
which under the Constitution require his personal
judgment."
But when the Constitution is viewed as a whole such an
interpretation of the vesting clause is completely consistent
with a construction which permits the Vice President to act
as President while the latter is unable to perform the duties
of his office. Thus it has been pointed out:"
"* * * The restrictions laid 4own by the courts apply
to the delegation of executive power by the President to his
subordinates, and should not by analogy be extended to the
devolution of this power in such a way as to defeat the
purpose of the succession clause. The records of the Federal
Convention give no indication that the framers of the vesting
clause would preclude the possibility of an acting President
in case of vacancy or inability in the Presidency. Their sole
purpose in writing the vesting clause appears to have been
the establishment of a single, as contrasted with a plural,
STheodore W. Dwight, Preldentlal inability, Vol. 183 No. Am. Rev. 438,
443 (November 1881): Representative Henry A. Wlse and Senator Robert J.
Walker, Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., let seu. 4-8 (1841); Senator Charles W.
Jones, 13 Cong. Rec. 142 (1881), 14 Id. 918 (1883).
, Drown and Silva, Presidential Inability, House Committee Print, supro
note 22, 12.
b (d. 12-13. See also, Sllva, op. off. supre note 11, 78-17.
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exeealiAe I .pUrpOW of the CUCM4ssionj causa sokms to
haVe been to Provide a substitute for the President in certain
cases, not to provide for the creation of another 1-rftide#nt,.
The rule is well established that. the different clau&es should
be given effet and reconciled if possible. The conclusion i,
therefore that the clause vesting executive powtr inl the
President. should be construed in such a way as to allow for
an acting President, who will exeivise oxeutivo power inl
cms of the Presidenit's removal, death, ixsigniat ion, or
inability until the disability patiks or another Presidext
is eleced."
The strongest. argument that canl be made is that. wliicJi
springs fromn past; practice. It is that whei isucx wion occurs
by reason of death, the Vice Preideiit becomiet Presidont, mid
it is argued that the saie result lust. necessarily follow in
eaeli of the other contingeies enumerated in the -same clause,
including "inability to discharge the Powers anid D)uties of
the said Office.." Indeed, it, is this "exinstitutional custoi"
as it has been described, 38 involving tteth of a Pre sident,
which has heated whatever constitutional doubts mapy be &%id
to exist.
All seven Vice Presidents, who lhavo ucee to the
Presidenicy upon the death of the President, have takei, thie
Presidential oath and have been generally m%%oniked as
President of the United Statw-s," John Tyler was the first
to establish this precedent when Williamn Henry Hlarriiin
died in 1841, tond the principle laid down by hill was fol.
lowedt by~ six other Vice Pruidelits upon the dea-mth of the
President inl oficeY Although President Iyler's itction
might readily have beeni quesionedl had historical materials
onl the framers' intent been at hand," tho fact, remaniins that
it has bem relied onl for the proposition that the Vic* Presii.
delit becomes Presidenit when the elected Presidwit dies\--A
propostion searvc'ly to NN quostiontd todKay. Corwin sa~ys
in this connection:
NDbvtd Pelimaz. Presidciatl Inob(Wty, Ihous* CN~mtt* Print, esgrt
note 22, 24-*25.
OGJo.bn Tyler, Millard MIlmore Andrew :ohzkoon, Cheter A. Arthur, Tbto.
dort 11twevel, iJothnj k'llvn (\x~l~tgc. and lArry S. Trumian.
Wa811ra. PrWefdewtbi 1"a1uity. 3 It. Nvt. 1W. 130. 15t-1N's 005.71.
81 Ianen. op. cit. evpra not* 21, 704.
0 Fdward S. C%.rwin. The Nreen~u: 0*Ice *i4 PowCEV, 84 (103?).
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
"That Tyler was wrong in his reading of the original
intention of the Constitution is certain. It was clearly the
expectation of the Framers that the Vice-President should
remain Vice-President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever
the occasion of his succession, and should become President
only if and when he was elected as such. Tyler's exploit,
however, having been repeated six times, must today be
regarded as having become law of the land for those in-
stances in which the President, through death, resignation,
removal, or other cause, has disappeared from the scene."
As Corwin goes on to point out, it was the possibility that
this precedent might be extended to cases of Presidential
inability-permanently ousting the incumbent which de-
terred two Vice Presidents--Arthur and Marshall-from
undertaking to exercise the powers and duties of the office of
President during the prolonged illnesses of Presidents
Garfield and Wilson, respectively. Neither Vice President
wished to be regarded as a "usurper." This possible risk
also may have led these former Presidents to minimize or
deny their disability. Other factors, however, of political
nature,.were present in both cases.
The problem of succession to the Presidency was con-
sidered immediately after former President Eisenhower's
heart attack in September 1955. Congress was not in ses-
sion, and there was no immediate international crisis. On
the basis of medical opinions and a survey of the urgent
problems demanding Presidential action immediately or in
the near future, Attorney General Brownell orally advised
the Cabinet and the Vice President that the existing situa-
tion did not require the Vice President to exercise the powers
and duties of the President under Article II of the
Constitution.' 0 All concerned accepted this opinion, and a
plan was worked out to enable the executive branch to func-
tion during the President's illness which included having
former Vice President Nixon preside at meetings of the Cab-
inet and the National Security Council. On October 21,1955,
Mr. Brownell conferred with the President in his hospital
room at Denver, and advised him of the legal basis of the ac-
o Brownell, op. fit. supra note 80, at 196.
-* -
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tion taken, and that no written authorizations were required
to ensure that his previously established policies would be
executed and that the Government activities would continue
without interruption." Thereafter, informal discussions
took place between the President and the Vice President con-
cerning "what the Vice President's role should be in the event
of a similar unfortunate occurrence, or any other happening
which would disable the President temporarily at a time
when presidential action was required." Moreover, when
President Eisenhower was operated on for ileitis in 1956,
it is said that Vice President Nixon stood by fully prepared
to initiate, "as acting President, whatever action would be
necessary in case of international emergency; for it was
realized that the announced intention of the President to
undergo a serious operation might entice a hostile foreign
power to make some drastic move in the expectation of find-
ing, at the critical moment, confused and uncertain leader-
ship in the United States." "
While the overwhelming weight of authority and the
strongest arguments support the theory that the Vice Presi-
dent is merely an acting President during the latter's dis-
ability, the precedent established by Tyler and followed by
six other Vice Presidents in taking the oath of President
upon a President's death, coupled with the lack of a close
relationship and understanding between the President and
the Vice President, created sufficient doubt to deter both
Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall from discharging the
powers and duties of the President's office during periods of
Presidential inability. In the Eisenhower Administration,
arrangements were made between President Eisenhower and
Vice President Nixon, discussed hereafter, designed to pro-
vide continuing leadership in the executive branch of the
Government in the event of the President's inability, and to
make clear the constitutional legitimacy of the Vice Presi-
dent's action, should he be obliged to discharge the powers
and duties of the office for the duration of the inability.
In my view, there is a clear constitutional distinction be-
tween the situation in which a President is permanently re.
*a . 202.
*M. 202-208.
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moved from office by death and the situation in which he
holds office but is temporarily unable to exercise its powers
and duties. In the former case, the precedents of several
deaths in office have established that the Vice President
succeeds to the Presidency. In the latter case, he cannot so
succeed because the President, the individual chosen by the
people to occupy the office of Chief Magistrate, is still incum-
bent. In view of this distinction, the fact that the Vice Presi-
dent succeeds to the office of President when the elected
President dies does not establish the proposition that he
becomes President when he merely exercises the powers and
duties of that office during the incumbent's temporary
inability.
II
Who determines whether the inability exists? Who deter-
mines whether the inability is ended?
I now turn to two subsidiary questions:
1. Who has the authority under the Constitution to decide
whether inability exists; and
2. Who is authorized to make the determination that the
inability is over?
These are important problems upon which scholarly
opinion differs somewhat.
1. The large majority is of the view that the Vice President
or other "officer" designated by law to act as President has
the authority under the Constitution to ecide when inability
exists." Both of my immediate predecessors favored this
SUva, op. oft. supra note 11, 100-102; Davis, op. oft. supra note 7, 13;
Senator Augustus H. Garland, 13 Cong. Ree. 139-141 (1881); Senator El-
bridge 0. Lapbam, 14 Cong. Ree. 917 (1883); Lyman Trumbull, 133 No. Am.
Rev. 417, 420-422 (1881); Benjamin F. Butler, id., 431-433; Presidential
Inability, House Committee Print, op. cit. supra note 22. Thomas K. Pin-
letter, id. 27-28; Joseph B. Kallenbach, (d. 45. Hearings op. oit. aupra note
25. Sidney Ifyman, id. 58-50; Roger P. Peters, id. 122; C. Herman Prltchett,
id. 71; John H. Romanl, id. 43-44.
The Constitution does not define Inability, and It has been the subject of
varying definitions, none authoritative. It has been suggested that as a mat-
ter of sound Interpretation the definition of Inability should cover all cases,
permanent or transient, physical or mental, In which a President Is In fact
unable to discharge a power or duty required to be discharged In the public
interest. (See Silva, Id. 171). Most scholars are opposed to defining Inabll.
lly In any amendment to the Constitution or in legislation.
* .1) 'b'~ 't\ . Vr. ZC'..- "' 'j~~.Y'Y" ' ' -'' *''
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interpretation. Attorney General Brownell summed up the
legal basis for concluding that the Vice President is the sole
judge of a President's inability, where the President is unable
to do it himself as follows:"
" * * This is so because the Constitution does not state
who should determine the President's inability in the many
circumstances in which, as the founders themselves must
have foreseen, it cannot be the President himself. The
Cabinet could not have been intended to judge the issue, since
this body is not referred to in the Constitution. It is not the
Congress, except by the negative sanction of impeachment
and conviction for a wrongful attempt to exercise power. Nor
is it the Supreme Court, because the question of presidential
inability is hardly one which fits any type of jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution on that tribunal. But the
power to determine the inability of the President rests in the
Vice President not simply because the Constitution places
it nowhere else. By a well-known principle of law, whenever
any official by law or person by private contract is designated
to perform certain duties on the happening of certain con-
tingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person who bears
the responsibility for performing the duties must also
determine when the contingency for the exercise of his powers
arises. Similarly, under the present Constitution, it is the
President who determines when his inability has terminated
and he is ready once more to execute his office."
There are conflicting views. One school of thought be-
lieves that the right to make the inability declaration belongs
to Congress." Cooley argued that Congress may determine
inability because the Constitution confers this authority in
the "necessary and proper" clause, reason dictates it, the de-
cision of Congress alone can be final, and English precedents
involving Parliament and a few disabled Kings may be relied
on in support of congressional action."
*Brownell, op. cit. e(pro note 80, 204.
" Early authorities are cited by Silva, op. cat. eupro note 11, 105-107. More
recent authority will be found In note 53.
r Thomas M. Cooley, Vol. 188 No. Am. Rev. 422, 42-427 (November 1881).
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Persuasive arguments have been raised in opposition to the
theory that Congress has the power to determine speciflo
cases of inability or to provide by general law a method for
deciding such cases. One is that since the Constitution ex-
pressly provides in Article II for succession when both the
President and Vice President are disabled, it excludes the
right of Congress to act in the case of Presidential inability
only. This is an application of the familiar maxim in
statutory construction, incluio tniu, ecolwtio alteriWs. It
is an argument favored by Attorneys General Brownell"
and Rogers, although the latter also stressed Professor
Sutherland's contention that ending the President's duties
by ordinary legislation would run counter to the doctrine of
separation of powers.5 Apart from sound constitutional
interpretation, there are practical considerations since "each
act of Congress must have for its validity the concurrent
action of the president.""
Both of my immediate predecessors were, therefore,
strongly opposed to the legislative or judicial route for re-
solving the problem. Mr. Brownell said: "Ordinary legisla.
tion would only throw one more doubtful element into the
picture, for the statute's validity could not be tested until the
occurrence of the presidential inability, the very time at
which uncertainty must be precluded."" Authority is
divided on this point." I concur in Mr. Brownell's
judgment.
* Butter, op. off. supra note 44, 428, 482; Davis. op. oft. eupra note 7, 18-14.
* Brownell, op. cit. supra note 80, 208.
f Hearings, op. oft. supra note 81, 170, 17.0
a Butler, op. oit. supra note 44, 48L Cornellus W. Wickersham, Chairman
of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Federal Constitution,
expressing the views of the Committee, stated: "It Is extremely doubtful
whether Congress has power to deal with the matter without a constitutional
amendment and clearly the ambiguity of the present provialona cannot be
cured by act of Congress alone." Hearings, op. ofl. eupra note 81, 95.
* Brownell, op. cit. supra note 80, 205.
SAmong those who recently expressed themselves in favor of an amend*
ment to the Constitution upon the ground that it Is either necessary or de.
sirable are: Stephen K. Bailey, Hon. Peter Frellnghuysen, Jr., Richard 0.
Huber, Joseph B. Kallenbacb, Arthur Krock, Jack W. Peltason, C. Herman
Pritchett, Arthur B. Sutherland, Hon. John J. Sparkman (Preesdential Is.
abUl(i, House Committee Print, op. oft. #epro note 28, 69-08). Edgar W.
Waugh, Charles 8. Rhyne (Hearings, op. off. supra note 81, 127, 191).
Equally distinguished are those who currently assert that proposed plans of
Presidential Inability may be carried out by statute. Among these are:
Everett 8. Brown, Edward S. Corwln, William F. Crosskey, Charles Falrman,
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2. There remains the difficult question: Who makes the
decision where the parties involved are in disagreement that
the President's inability is ended, and that he is ready to
resume the functions of his office!
Unquestionably, those scholars who claim the Vice Presi-
dent becomes President upon the latter's inability would
assert that the Vice President may not be divested of his
authority by recovery of, or action taken thereafter by, the
President. In my opinion, this view does violence to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, and would defeat the will of
the people.
Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers were in agreement
that the President could reclaim the discharge of the powers
and duties of his office merely by announcing that his inability
had.terminated, and that he is ready now to execute his
office." In my opinion this interpretation of the Constitution
is clearly correct. The force of popular opinion, the people's
sense of constitutional propriety, and the cooperation of
Congress could be counted on to support the President's de-
cision if he acted properly.
There is no complete agreement among scholars as to who
determines whether Presidential inability exists, and who
determines when it ends. In the opinion of my two immediate
predecessors, and in my own opinion, while the Vice President
may declare when the President's inability exists, it is the
President alone who has the constitutional authority to
determine when his inability is over. This is implicit in the
fact that the Vice President would merely be serving as acting
President in such a contingency, and that there is only one
President in office. The President's conclusion that he is able
to resume the discharge of the powers and duties of the office
must of necessity be accepted as binding unless and until he
is removed by impeachment proceedings. As was said by one
constitutional scholar:" "The Constitution recognizes but
one method of removing the President, and that is by convic-
tion on articles of impeachment."
David Fellman, James Hart, Arthur N. Holcombe, Hon. Herbert Hoover, Mirk
DeW. Howe (Prealdential Inability, House Committee Print, op. ct#. supro
note 28, 63-68).
SBrownell, op. cit. eupra note 80, 204; Rogers, Hearingt, op. off. apre
note 31, 175.
- Senator Coke, 13 Cong. Ree. 141 (1881).
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III
Is the understanding between President Eisenhower and Vice
President Nixon a desirable precedent to be followed by
this Administration?
Finally, there is before me the question whether the under-
standing between President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon on Presidential inability is a desirable precedent for
this Administration to follow.
On March 8, 1958, the former President and Vice Presi.
dent, in consultation with the Attorney General, reduced to
memorandum form their understanding of the constitutional
role of the Vice President as acting President. It de-
clared: "
"The President and the Vice President have agreed that
the following procedures are in accord with the purposes
and provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution,
dealing with Presidential inability. They believe that these
procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only,
are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are
consistent with its present provisions and implement its clear
intent,
"1. In the event of inability the President would-if pos-
sible-so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President
would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and
duties of the office until the inability had ended.
"2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him ap-
propriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and would
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
"3. The President, in either event, would determine when
the inability had ended and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties of the Office."
It seems to me that this understanding is entirely con-
sistent with the correct interpretation of the Constitution.
The introduction itself purports to bind only the prior
incumbents of the office of the Presidency and Vice Presi-
" N.Y. Tine, March 4, 1958, p. 1, col. 2, p. 17, col. 1.
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denoy. This is an appropriate technique which leaves sub-
sequent administrations free, as they would in any event be,
to follow or reject the precedent
Section 1 states that in event of inability, the President
would, if possible, inform the Vice President of his con-
dition, in which case the Vice President would serve as acting
President until the inability is over.
This provision contemplates that the President will volun-
tarily announce his own inability, if it exists, for the pur-
pose of encouraging the Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office until the President has re-
covered. This section helps to remove the obstacle which
caused responsible Government officials to refrain from act-
ing in the Garfield and Wilson cases. No one can possibly
accuse the Vice President of being disloyal or a usurper if he
undertakes to serve as acting President upon the request of
the President. This section embraces most of the cases of
Presidential inability likely to arise.
Section 2 deals with a situation in which the President is
unable to communicate with the Vice President. In that
event, the Vice President may take action "after such con-
sultation as seems to him appropriate under the circum-
stances."
It will be noted that section 2 leaves the determination of
Presidential inability in the first instance where the Consti-
tution places it now-in the Vice President. There is one
addition in section 2 which is absent from the Constitution--
the Vice President may consult with other persons as seems
to him appropriate.
Even though the Vice President need not under the
Constitution consult any one, it is clearly wise and conducive
to strengthening his position if he seeks advice from other
persons before presuming to exercise the powers and duties
of the Presidency. Since the Constitution is silent on the
matter, no specific persons to be consulted are mentioned, and
of course, in view of the latitude given, he might conceivably
consult no one before he acted.
Section 8 states that the President may, whether he or the
Vice President has declared the inability, determine when
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it is over, and forthwith resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the office.
Here again, the understanding represents what my two
immediate predecessors and I regard to be authorized by the
Constitution-that the President may regain the powers of
his office without the concurrence of any other official or group
if he is of the opinion that his inability has been removed.
Attorney General Brownell has said:"' "The Eisenhower-
Nixon understanding, by providing, first, for the Vice Presi-
dent's determination of presidential inability and, second,
for the President's determination of when that inability
terminates, thus coincides perfectly with article II, section 1,
of the Constitution as originally drafted in 1787 * * *."
This was also Attorney General Rogers' opinion and it is
mine too, without reservation.
Since this understanding may prove to be a persuasive
precedent of what the Constitution means until it is amended
or other action is taken, I would favor that the present
Administration follow it. Cumulative precedents of this
kind may be valuable in the future.
IV
Conltusions
In my judgment, there is no question that the Vice Presi-
dent acts as President in the event of the President's inability
and acts in that capacity "until the disability be removed." I
do not believe that the practice which has grown up to the
effect that the Vice President "becomes President" in event
of the death of the President creates any substantial doubt.
I believe also that there is no substantial question that it is
the Vice President who determines the President's inability
if the President is unable to do so; and that it is the President
who asserts when the inability has ceased. These conclusions
are supported by the great majority of reputable scholars
who have examined the problem, as well as by my prede-
cessors.
In this connection, it is important to note the development
of the Vice Presidency in recent years, and the changes in
O Brownell, op. ofi. supro note 80, 204.
. . i -
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that office which have come about, particularly in the past
two decades. During this time the Vice Presidency has
moved substantially from its anomalous status under the
Constitution in both the executive and legislative branches
towards the former. Recent Vice Presidents have been given
significant executive responsibility and an important voice in
the highest affairs of state. The working relationship be-
tween the President and Vice President has become increas-
ingly close and, during the past Administration as well as
the present one, the President has been concerned to keep the
Vice President current and informed with regard to Presi-
dential policies.
While one cannot predict with certainty that this trend will
continue in future administrations, I regard it as altogether
likely because, in an age marked by crisis, this course seems to
be dictated by the necessities of our time. It is significant
with regard to the problems discussed in this opinion because,
in my judgment, it greatly reduces the possibility of an im-
passe between the President and Vice President, and thoughts
in the public mind that the Vice President should be regarded
as a potential usurper of office. It also is relevant because it
greatly increases the practical capacity of the Vice President
to act as President in the event of Presidential inability,
whatever the cause.
I am of the opinion that the understanding between the
President and the Vice President which I have approved
above is clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a
practical solution to the problem as is possible.
Respectfully,
ROBERT F. KENNEDY.
"90-8 0-46--9
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Exiinrr No. 4
(The following is an excerpt from the book, "Six Crises," by former
Vice President Richard M. Nixon, pp. 178 to 180, 1962:)
The problem of presidential disability is complex, dating back to
the Constitutional Convention in 1787 when Delaware's Delegate
John Dickinson brought it up and got no answer.
Authorities and experts have written books on the subject, all deal-
ing with the ambiguity of article II, section I, clause 5 of the Con-
stitution, which says:
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resigna-
tion, or Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the
same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law
provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President.
and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.
Simply stated, this clause does not make clear: Who decides when
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office? just what devolves upon the Vice President, the "powers and
duties" or the "office" itself? can the President resume office once he
has given it up? who decides if the President is well enough to
resume his office if he can at all?
Anyone, I think, can imagine 2 dozen troublesome contingencies
which might become involved in passing the powers of a President to
a Vice President, and constitutional lawyers, who have studied the
question for more than a hundred years, can think of 200 more. Pres-
ident Eisenhower, after studying the problem closely, was intent
on solving the practical problem of giving his Vice President the
authority to act immediately in a crisis, if necessary. He mentioned
several alternatives, but kept coming back to the idea of writing a
letter which would give the Vice President alone the authority to de-
cide when the President was unable to carry on-that is, when the
President himself was unable to make the decision.
In early February, the President called Rogers and me into his
office, commented that lie thought he had licked the problem, and
handed each of us a copy of a letter. Then he leaned back in his
chair and, while we followed on our copies, lie read a four-page letter
to us, beginning, "Dear Dick." We made some minor suggestions and
he incorporated them into the letter and then sent it on to his secre-
tary, Ann Whitman, for final typing. Marked "Personal and Secret,"
one copy went to me, one to Bill Rogers as Attorney General, and one
to John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State and ranking member of
the Cabinet.
With the exception of our very minor suggestions, the letter was
wholly Eisenhower's in concept and drafting, and it was a master-
piece. Leaving the White House, Bill Rogers remarked that Eisen-
hower would have made an outstanding lawyer, for the letter
handled the contingencies of a very complex problem from every
angle and was as good a drafting job as any constitutional expert
could have done.
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The President made public the following key paragraphs:
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following pro-
cedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of article 2, section 1,
of the Constitution, dealing with presidential inability. They believe that
these procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only, are in no
sense outside or contrary to the Constitution, but are consistent with its
present provisions and implement its clear intent.
(1) In the event of Inability the President would-if possible-so inform the
Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting President,
exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from
so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers and
duties of the Office.
This letter established historical precedent. Eisenhower was the
first President in American history to take cognizance of and act
upon a serious gap in our Constitution. President Kennedy, even
before his inauguration, drew up an identical list of procedures
for his Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, to follow in exercising the
rights and duties of the President in the event of Kennedy's inca-
pacity. The new administration adopted in its entirety the section
of the Eisenhower letter which was made public, and it would be
fair to assume that President Kennedy's successor will follow the
precedent.
But what must be clearly understood is that the agreement Presi-
dent Eisenhower set forth in his letter to me, and the one President
Kennedy has entered into with Vice President Johnson, are only as
good as the will of the parties to keep them. Presidents and Vice
Presidents have not always had the mutual trust and the cordial re-
lations President Eisenhower had with me or that President Ken-
nedy has had with Vice President Johnson up to this time. Jealou-
siea and rivalries can develop within an administration which could
completely destroy such an agreement.
Only a constitutional amendment can solve the problem on a
permanent basis. President Eisenhower's agreement with me was
personal'and had the force of his authority only during his term
of office. President Kennedy's agreement is similarly limited.
These agreements, which are mere expressions of a President's de-
sires, do not have the force of law. Even a law passed by Congress
might be subject to constitutional challenge. However, such a law
would express the will of Congress and should be passed while the
incumbent President is in good health and before a presidential elec-
tion year drags politics into an already complex problem. The ex-
periences of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower should have taught
us a lesson. Surely the time has come for a truly bipartisan pro-
gram to draw up a constitutional amendment, which would define the
rights and duties of a Vice President during any period when the
President of the United States is incapacitated.
The urgent need for such an amendment becomes crystal clear
when a President is disabled, but that is precisely the time when
politics bar any reasonable agreement on the wording of such an
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amendment. The time to begin solving this problem is now, when
the incumbent President is in good health and at a safe distance
from the politics of a presidential election year. It is hardly
necessary to point out that these perilous times in which we live
will continue, and more than ever before our Nation will need an
able and healthy Chief Executive or Acting Chief Executive at all
times.
Action on this problem will have important side effects as well.
It will assure the continued useful employment of the Vice President
as a deputy of the President rather than as a fifth wheel in the
Government, another precedent established by Eisenhower. The
Vice President will thus become an integrated member of the incum-
bent administration able and ready to take over the rights and
duties of the President if it becomes necessary. This being true,
it also will bolster the new political trend of selecting capable men
as Vice Presidential nominees, men to whom the Presidential
nominee would be willing to turn over his duties during a period of
disability, rather than the selection of men solely on geographical,
factional, or party appeasement considerations.
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EXHIBIT No. 5
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
C.4 Ct c# T"t PNa[Cg..r
SI irt C SMrit4,J Ng JIsess Orlc
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Honorable Estes Kefauver
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Kefauver:
On behalf of the American Bar Association, I wish to express our pleasure that
you and Senator Keating have co-sponsored S.J. Res. 35, a joint resolution pro-
posing a Constitutional amendment relating to the clarification of procedures to
be followed in the case of inability of the President of the United States.
I wish to personally voice my agreement with everything stated to your committee
on June 11 by Lewis F. Powell, the President-Elect Nominee of the American Bar
Association. We are most optimistic over the favorable outlook for adoption of
S. J. Res. 35 in this session of Congress, and are delighted that such strong sup-
port is evident from the Administration, the New York State Bar Association, and
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
As Mr. Powell has stated to your Committee, the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association first urged the adoption of the language of S.J. Res. 35 in 1960.
In 1962, the House of Delegates of the Association looked again to the problem of
Presidential Inability. While the House of Delegates approved the language of a
statute to deal with this problem, it also emphasized that the 1960 position favor-
ing a Constitutional amendment should not be disturbed.
The Association strongly recommends the adoption of a Constitutional amendment
at the earliest possible time. As Mr. Powell stated to your committee when he
testified, the American Bar Association will work through the state and local bar
groups in securing ratification by the States. I am writing to the president of each
state bar urging support for S. J. Res. 35.
I commend you for your leadership in attempting to solve this serious problem.
Sincerely,
Sylvester C. Smith, Jr.
